

# THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. REFORMATION THEOLOGY. III. <i>Professor E. V. Gerhart</i> . . . . .	397
2. SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE PULPIT. SERMON II. USE AND ABUSE OF CAPITAL. <i>Newman Smyth, D. D.</i> . . . . .	423
3. COÖPERATIVE CREATION. II. <i>Rev. F. H. Johnson</i> . . . . .	436
4. WHAT MAY JUSTLY BE DEMANDED OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. <i>S. T. Dutton</i> . . . . .	455
5. EDITORIAL.	
Progressive Orthodoxy. I. Criteria of Theological Progress . . . . .	466
The Revision of the Old Testament, and the Religious Public . . . . .	472
6. THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE . . . . .	477
The Predestination Controversy in the Lutheran Church. <i>A Lutheran Observer.</i>	
The Institute of Hebrew. <i>Professor Moore.</i> . . . . .	482
7. BOOK NOTICES . . . . .	482
Reusch's <i>Der Process Galilei's und die Jesuiten.</i> — The Centenary of Leicester Academy. — Marsh's <i>Lectures on the English Language</i> ; Origin and History of the English Language; The Earth as Modified by Human Action. — Rawlinson's <i>Egypt and Babylon.</i> — Morris's <i>Ecclesiology.</i> — <i>Obiter Dicta.</i>	
8. BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	492

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*Professors in Andover Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass., with the  
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
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REFORMATION THEOLOGY.

III. DOCTRINE OF GOD AND MAN: THE ATONEMENT: JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH: PERSONAL RELIGION.

THE two new potent ideas of the Reformation, the Scripture-principle and the faith-principle, were governed in their application to theological questions by the defective or one-sided Augustinian theory concerning the nature and design of the Christian religion.

The doctrine of God prevalent in scholasticism passed over into the Evangelical Church; but with some modifications. Greater stress was laid on divine sovereignty. The election of grace through Christ affirmed a direct communion by the Spirit between God and his people, thus supplanting the mediation of the Pope, the hierarchy, and the saints.

As regards man, the general conception of Augustine was asserted and rewrought. Hence the semi-Pelagian elements which since the time of John Cassian had been prevalent in the Roman Church were eliminated; but the unethical subjection of the race and of the individual to God survived.

The theory of the atonement intimated by Gregory of Nazianzum, dialectically constructed by Anselm, and vindicated by Thomas Aquinas, was accepted and perfected by the Reformers; but the negative conception of satisfaction made by Christ by suffering the penalty of sin was not supplemented by the affirmation of the positive counterpart.

Relatively to the fall and sin, the Reformers emphasized man's guilt in distinction from corruption, and the necessity of forgiveness in distinction from sanctification. In response to the question: What shall I do to be saved? they developed the principal doctrine of Protestantism by reproducing the central Pauline idea of



justification by faith. But faith was not definitely and steadily fixed on the divine-human personality of Christ; and justification was negative and putative rather than positive and real.

The salvation of the believer, as it was not contingent on personal worthiness, but turned on faith, which reposed on the promises of God, was rescued from the uncertainty and bondage entailed by the Roman dogma respecting the necessity of human merits. Personal religion became assured, more free and joyous. But deliverance from the consequences of sin was more influential in Christian experience than the fellowship of Christ glorified by his Spirit. The regenerate life, or the new creation, was not in the idea of personal religion a principle of equivalent force with deliverance from sin.

#### I.

Man in his state of misery constituted the point of departure for construing the incarnation and the Christian religion, both in mediæval scholasticism and in Reformation theology. The doctrine of God, as to its leading features, was in consequence the same in both. Majesty, omnipotence and omniscience, righteousness and justice, are in the one as in the other, the chief characteristics. There was, however, this difference. Whilst in the system of Augustine predestination was an inference from his conception of sin and grace, in Reformation theology, particularly as developed by Zuingli and Calvin, predestination was a metaphysical principle. An *a priori* idea of foreordination became the controlling force in the formation of the doctrine concerning God and his providence. Hence sovereignty, or God's sovereign counsel, was more prominent in the Calvinistic doctrine concerning God than in the doctrine of the pre-Reformation age.

The Author and Governor of the world, God deals with men according to the good pleasure of his own will. Exercising absolute authority in heaven and on earth, He requires unconditional obedience to his commands. On transgressors He inflicts temporal sufferings and terrific eternal penalties according to the rigid demands of violated justice. Men being absolutely dependent on Him for existence and all good, and God being responsible to no man, He puts down one and lifts up another as He pleases. As to his essence, He is inaccessible both to the reason of the sinner and to the understanding of his people. In as far as He chooses to reveal the purposes of his will, God may be known; but whether He reveals himself as He is objectively remains a question. Like mediæval scholasticism, the theology of the

Reformation was in large measure agnostic; but the agnostic principle was not allowed consistently to govern theological opinion or practical religion.<sup>1</sup>

Man is the subject of God's authority. Created good and holy, he was capable of rendering perfect obedience to the divine will. Having by willful transgression renounced allegiance to his Creator, he is fallen; being fallen and persistently disobedient he is a rebel against the divine government, and therefore the object of infinite displeasure. All claims to God's favor and sympathy have been forfeited; and his nature has become so depraved that, like a stone or a block, the unregenerate sinner is insensible to things heavenly and spiritual.<sup>2</sup>

These propositions concerning God, who is offended by disobedience, and man, the perverse transgressor, are in one respect valid, biblical, and consistent with sound ethical philosophy; in another respect, however, they are defective and unbiblical. They follow from the negative conception of God and man, or from reflection on the abnormal relation brought about by sin; but the positive truth of manhood, more profound than moral evil, exerts no modifying force. Thought contemplates chiefly the false attitude toward God of the transgressor, whilst his essential and original attitude, asserted and brought to light by the vital union of the personal creature with the personal Creator in Jesus of Nazareth, is ignored.

God's sovereignty and holiness, his power and punitive justice, come into the foreground, but his love, deeper than either, his sym-

<sup>1</sup> The difference between Democritus, Protagoras, Plotinus, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, Socinus, Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer is a great variation in degree and form of the negative hypothesis that the being of God is not, and cannot, be known; but not, as to the ultimate question, a difference in kind. Referring to Ex. xxxiv. 6 Calvin says: "*Deinde commemorari ejus virtutes, quibus nobis describitur non quis sit apud se sed qualis erga nos.*" Inst. I. x. 2. Again: "*Quare Deo libenter permittamus sui cognitionem. Ipse enim demum unus, ut inquit Hilarius, idoneus sibi testis est, qui nisi per se cognitus non est.*" Inst. I. xiii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> "*Lapis et truncus*" was the expression of Luther. Says the *Form of Concord*: "*Itaque credimus, quantum abest, ut corpus mortuum seipsum vivificare, atque sibiipsi corporalem vitam restituere possit, tantum abesse, ut homo, qui ratione peccati spiritualiter mortuus est, seipsum in vitam spirituales revocandi ullam facultatem habeat.*" Art. II. 2. The Reformed theologians refrained from using such strong figures of speech in describing natural corruption, but they laid more stress than did the Lutherans on the unconditional sovereignty of grace, so that in effect the position of man in relation to God was the same in both Confessions.



pathy with man as man, and his compassion toward the transgressor in his misery recede very much from view, and hold a subordinate place; the idea of the divine existence and the divine character being developed and fashioned more after the pattern of a mighty earthly monarch than after the pattern of a loving, tender father.<sup>1</sup>

The conception of man answers to the monarchical idea of God. Man is the subject of royal authority rather than a member of God's ethical household; the sinner is a rebel rather than a prodigal son; and he provokes the severe judgments of his sovereign rather than paternal compassion. Absolute dependence, the forfeiture of all rights, guilt and corruption, come into the foreground, rather than the deeper principle in human nature, the abiding vital action of the divine image. The difference between finite manhood and the infinite being of the Godhead is more emphatic than the affinity between divine life and human life; God's absolute sovereignty more than his absolute love; his attitude toward transgression and guilt more than toward man's ethical and spiritual constitution sustained and nourished in spite of moral evil; and his infinite aversion to his rebellious subject as sinful and corrupt more than his infinite yearning toward the prodigal as his lost child.

Hence God awakens dread rather than inspires confidence. He repels with greater force than He attracts. His compassion toward our fallen race is less conspicuous than his wrath, his blessing less than his curse. The condemnation of sin and the punishment of wickedness are more prominent in the dispensations of providence than his reconciliation in Christ with the guilty.

Doubtless God is sovereign, omnipotent, infinitely righteous and

<sup>1</sup> It deserves to be noted that of about one hundred and twenty prayers in the *Book of Common Prayer* nearly fifty begin by addressing the *Almighty* God. In the *Order of Worship* of the Reformed Church a like proportion begin with the same address. Judging from observation this rule has been prevailing in extemporaneous or free prayers offered by ministers and laymen. This fact is the more remarkable, as Christ and his apostles furnish us no examples. On the contrary, when our Lord says, After this manner therefore pray ye, He begins, Our Father who art in Heaven. A habit in vogue for ages of addressing the *Almighty* God in public and private prayer illustrates what a strong hold the physical conception of God has had on the Evangelical as on the Roman Church, whilst the ethical conception, God's paternal love, has never gained the prominence in the general Christian consciousness which it has in the books of the New Testament. To the comparative want of the ethical in the doctrine concerning God answers the comparative want of the ethical in the doctrine concerning man.

wise. As to his essence, however, God is love; and when we distinguish and relate his attributes, love is the subject of which his perfections are to be predicated. Love is sovereign, almighty, all-wise, righteous. Wrath is the infinite displeasure of his heart provoked by the violation of love; and the penalties of violated justice are inflicted by a compassionate Father who sympathizes with the misery of his child as intensely as He hates sin.

Man is indeed a rebel and the subject of violated law. But however deeply rooted moral evil, and however perverse his fallen life, the transgressor's inclination to do wrong is superficial contrasted with the original law of positive love to God after which his being was fashioned, a law which is ever asserting its vital force in the moral and religious history of individuals and nations. An adequate conception of man as man, or of man as a transgressor, can therefore not be developed from his perverseness and wickedness; a sound judgment of his wickedness presupposes the recognition of the true and distinguishing principle of human nature, the undying affinity of his finite spirit with infinite Spirit. Man is high of kin to God. From this point of view only may we rightly judge both of his relationship to God and of the wickedness of his transgression; but of the latter in the light of the former, not in the reverse order.

True, Reformation theology did proclaim God to be in Christ the Father of believers, and his elect people to be his adopted children. Between Christ and his people a direct and intimate fellowship was affirmed and vindicated. This was a new truth, of which Roman theology knew little or nothing, a truth which imparted a confidence and joy peculiar to the members of evangelical churches. Here was an important advance. But the principle is broader. The paternal relation of God cannot be limited to the elect. His fatherhood is for our race universal; all men, even in their natural state, sustain to Him a filial relation. The race has left the father's house, and is wasting the paternal inheritance with riotous living; but, though a prodigal, Adam does not cease to be God's son. Between the sonship of the wanderer feeding swine and the new sonship in Christ the difference is immense; but if for this reason we deny or ignore the filial relation existing in natural religion the doctrine of man cannot but be seriously at fault. The sonship in Christ will have no basis in human nature, and so far forth will be foreign to man's original endowments and relations.

As regards the fall, the nature of sin and depravity, the Reformers rejected the semi-Pelagian errors of the Roman Church, and

reaffirmed the better anthropology of Augustine; not only reaffirmed it, but also supplemented its deficiencies. His conception was mainly negative. Sin was the privation of good, and a falling short of right doing. According to the Reformers sin was both negative and positive; it was aversion to the good, and a violation of the right. The moral nature of the transgressor had by the fall been so thoroughly poisoned and paralyzed that his will was unapt to all spiritual good. Stress was laid especially on man's *guilt*, in distinction from the stain and impurity of sin; and in consequence also on the necessity of *forgiveness* in distinction from sanctification. The doctrines that sinfulness was enmity against God, that moral self-perversion was not superficial but radical, that the violation of the moral law incurred God's condemnation, and that the guilt of transgression could be pardoned by the free grace of God for Christ's sake, supplanted the superficial notion of moral evil prevalent in the Roman Church, and so far forth were the conditions for the development of more Scriptural teaching on repentance, faith, and godly living.

But the construction of a profounder doctrine concerning the radical force of moral evil became a reaction from one extreme to another. A superficial view of fallen human nature gave place to an excessive emphasis of sinfulness. An unwarranted confidence in moral ability was followed by the denial of all positive spiritual power. Scholasticism had falsely attributed meritoriousness to arbitrary works, ascetic self-denial, and external acts of obedience. Whilst the Reformers emancipated the church from this bondage, they failed to see the element of truth underlying Pelagian errors. Of sinful humanity they denied the abiding capacity of response to Christ, and even questioned spiritual receptivity. So exclusively did anthropology consider man's depravity, and so largely was it occupied with guilt and pardon, that in the construction of doctrine little or no account was taken of the deeper truth that, though depraved and condemned, all men nevertheless live, and move, and have their being in God. The command to preach the gospel to all men goes on the presumption, not only that all men really need the life and redemption of Christ, but also that all men when addressed by Christ, through the agency of the Spirit, or when the mighty truths of the gospel apprehend their souls, are at least so far receptive to it that they may open or close their hearts to its heavenly virtue.

## II.

As to the fall and sin, so also in regard to the atonement; the Reformation surmounted the superficial dogmas of the Roman Church. Rejecting the errors of the Mystics and the Scotists, the idea of a satisfaction rendered to God by suffering the penalty of death, an idea wrought out with extraordinary acumen by Anselm, and vindicated by Thomas Aquinas, was reproduced and perfected. That the passion and death of Christ was a propitiation for sin became the cardinal principle in the doctrine of the atonement held by the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. The principle is valid; but, though some of the deficiencies of Anselm were supplied, yet the doctrine as rewrought by the Reformer does not meet all the conditions of the problem. The widespread restiveness under the traditional theory shows the propriety of modern attempts to furnish a more adequate statement.

Sin is false self-assertion, the self-assertion of man against God, responsive to incitement from the kingdom of darkness. False self-assertion involves a threefold wrong: a violation of the original communion of love with God, incurring guilt; a perversion and falsification of man, thus becoming a disorganizing force in human nature; and obedience to the will of a false authority, thus subjecting human life to the bondage of a foreign dominion. These three things are different phases of one unnatural and unhuman principle.

The redemption of Christ abolishes sin, both in its root and in its branches. He accomplishes this end by a new creation of humanity in himself. The second Adam, in becoming the perfected Head of a new race, fulfills all the conditions of complete redemption.

As sin is the false self-assertion of man, involving him in a threefold abnormal attitude, redemption is a threefold work: expiating the guilt of sin and perfecting the true communion of love, Christ is the reconciliation with God; abolishing the law of sin in human nature, and perfectly fulfilling the law of God, He is the ideal man; victorious over the kingdom of darkness in his personal history, on the cross, and in the resurrection from the dead, He destroys the alien dominion of Satan. An adequate theory of the atonement must be commensurate with the wholeness of the redemptive work.

An early theory, overlooking God's curse resting on sin and man's thorough self-perversion, turned its eye on the bondage of

man to the foreign kingdom of Satan. The death of Christ was the ransom paid to the devil for the release of our apostate race. Mistaking Jesus for a mere man, Satan accepted the ransom; but Jesus, by the hidden might of his Godhead, overcame the usurper, and released the race which by deception had been seduced. This theory of redemption, though variously modified, and though unsatisfactory to not a few theologians, was nevertheless the leading doctrine for ten centuries, and even longer. It was an effort to express an integral part of the truth, without which the doctrinal conception falls short of embracing the whole of redemption.

Anselm, dissatisfied with the traditional theory, reflected on sin in its deeper relation to God. Emphasizing, not the rights of Satan, but the penalty entailed by transgression, he saw in the death of Christ the expiation of guilt. Jesus, the incarnate Son, made full satisfaction to God for the dishonor done to his authority by man's disobedience. The satisfaction consisted in the voluntary suffering of the penalty of death. The kernel of the Anselmic theory, the necessity of a propitiation for sin, developed in *Cur Deus Homo*, was supported by the best theologians of the Middle Ages, and became the inheritance of the Reformation. It has lived in the Protestant churches down to the present time.

The entire theory, however, as held by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, was not admitted into Reformation theology. It was freely reproduced, and in several particulars amended and perfected.

1. Anselm laid exclusive stress on our Lord's voluntary death. The life of Christ, and his sufferings endured before the crucifixion, did not enter into the theory. The Reformers, on the contrary, made due account of his deep humiliation, and the bitter sufferings which characterized his entire history in the flesh; the offering of himself on the cross being regarded as the climax of his passion.

2. Anselm deduced the infinite merits of the sacrifice from its voluntariness. Christ was under no obligation to submit to the pain and ignominy of crucifixion. His death was in this respect a work of supererogation, and therefore infinitely meritorious. Though holding the offering to be voluntary, the Reformers laid chief stress on the dignity of our Lord's person. The sinless perfection and spotless holiness of his life qualified Him to offer himself an acceptable sacrifice to God. Meritoriousness was discerned not so much in the voluntariness of the act as in the degree of his passion and the quality of the offering.



3. Anselm made no account in his theory of the condemnation and curse of God. The chief thing was that the incarnate Son was not bound by any moral or judicial necessity, but that he chose to die of the motion of his own will. But the Reformers, regarding sin as the willful violation of the law of God, also emphasized the divine curse. The infinite displeasure of God incurred by transgression was borne by Christ in his life of humiliation, but chiefly on the cross. This modification, to the effect that Christ, bearing God's curse resting upon a guilty world, by his death made propitiation for sin, was peculiar to the Reformation, and constitutes an important advance on the Anselmic theory.

4. Anselm, like other prominent scholastics, supposed that the death of Christ expiated the guilt of *original* sin, not the guilt of actual sins. The penalties due the individual for overt acts of transgression were either to be borne by himself or to be remitted by the church on the ground of penances and other meritorious works done by the transgressor. But the Reformers recognized in the death of Christ an adequate propitiation for all sins, actual as well as inborn. Christ was an all-sufficient Saviour, forasmuch as He had suffered all the penalties pronounced upon transgressors by the justice of God.

5. Anselm, a loyal son of the hierarchical system of mediæval Romanism, held that the infinite merits of Christ acquired by his voluntary death were in the keeping of the church. By the Pope and the priesthood these merits were applied or set to the account of the faithful. Not Christ himself by his Spirit, but his vicar, the successor of St. Peter, dispensed the benefits of redemption by means of the various rites and ceremonies belonging to the Roman system. Instead, the Reformers by the assertion of the material principle, the great doctrine of justification by faith alone, taught that God, on the ground of Christ's atoning sacrifice, was himself the gracious dispenser of the benefits of redemption to them that believe. Thus through Jesus Christ the throne of grace became directly accessible, and personal fellowship between God and the believer was established.

Whilst by such important modifications of the Anselmic theory the doctrine of the atonement became much more Scriptural, yet the kernel of the theory, the chief and best product of Anselm's dialectics, remained. Divested of the excrescences of the papal system, the principle, that by suffering the penalty of death Christ fully satisfied the demands of violated divine justice against the sinner, became in the Reformation doctrine of the atonement the fruitful source of spiritual peace and a joyous practical piety.

The principle of the Anselmic theory exerted a double influence. Being an important truth, but a part only of the whole truth, it proved to be the strength and the weakness of the Reformation doctrine. It has general and permanent worth, yet suffers from serious defects.

The deficiency may be seen in two phases of the idea of atonement. The one is the emphasis put on Christ's *merits* instead of himself. The other is *the lack of the positive ethical factor* in the idea of satisfaction.

1. As regards the first defect, the Reformation doctrine fails to recognize the right relation between the Redeemer and his sacrificial death. The doctrine passes from Christ to his work, from the mystery of his divine-human personality to the value of what He did, and accords greater reconciliatory significance to his death than to himself. The Person is in order to his work. An expiatory death for the remission of sin was a necessity, and this drew after it the other necessity, that the victim be divine-human.

In this respect there was no change. The want of insight into the objective relationship is the same in the theology of Anselm and of the Reformation. Both systems repose confidence mainly in the work done by the Redeemer, not in the Redeemer himself; appreciating his Person on account of his work, rather than his work on account of his Person. Hence it is that justifying faith, as expounded by the Reformation, fastens its eye not so much on Jesus Christ as on the meritoriousness of his sufferings and death.

Moreover, Anselm and the Reformation both teach that the merits of Christ acquired by his propitiatory death are, to an indefinite extent, in excess of the actual demands of a sinful world. The expiatory value of his sacrifice suffices for the forgiveness of the sins of all men of all ages, and of any conceivable number of individuals yet unborn. His merits are not only commensurate with all possible demands, but absolutely inexhaustible. This idea, taught and supported by the reasoning of Anselm, was not only generally accepted by Roman theologians, but occasioned (if it did not produce) and sustained the Roman notion of supererogatory works of righteousness. Christ's merits were excessive or greater than the violated honor of God unconditionally demanded, and thus greater than necessary to expiate the guilt of transgressors. Applied to the saints, this principle supported the notion that by extraordinary self-denial, that is, by observing the counsels of Christ which were optional, such as fasting, in addition to his commands which were directly obligatory, the faithful also



might acquire a degree of worthiness in excess of their moral needs. They might obtain and possess much more merit than was necessary to commend them to Christ's favor. The excessive merits of the saints, added to the excessive merits of Christ, became a rich treasury of the church, which, by virtue of his authority as the vicar of Christ, the Pope might dispense for the relief of the misery of sinners on earth and in purgatory.

In one respect the Reformation entirely overcame the error of supererogatory works. The doctrine of salvation by grace alone, without the works of the law, on the ground of the infinite value of Christ's atoning sacrifice, destroyed entirely the foundation on which rested the notion that by the self-imposed, minute, and persistent observance of Christ's counsels, and by performing the obligatory works of obedience, believers might acquire personal merits before God. The ground of forgiveness and acceptance was to be found alone in our Lord's redemptive work. In another respect, however, the notion of supererogation was continued by the Reformation, and made prominent; but supererogation was confined exclusively to the expiatory value of the passion and death of Christ. So far forth, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Rome, and the Reformers occupy common ground. The notion arises partly from a just appreciation of the greatness of redemption, but especially from the arbitrary and mechanical method of construing the facts of Christianity, a method common to both systems of theology.

Two things supported the Reformation doctrine of supererogation: (1.) The virtue of the atonement was presumed to be, not in the personal Redeemer, but in his humiliation, passion, and death; and not so much in the passion He suffered and in the death He died as in the vicarious merits obtained by his death and passion. (2.) These merits were conceived quantitatively rather than qualitatively. The extraordinary quality of his passion arose from the extraordinary dignity of his Person; but the adequacy of the satisfaction made to violated justice turned on the degree and the extent of the sufferings borne by this extraordinary Person. The consequence deduced from these premises could not well be other than the opinion that the sufferings of Christ were greater than necessary to expiate the guilt of the elect. The Redeemer not only endured sufferings commensurate with the necessities of offended justice regarding the elect, but, as the consequence of the extent and quality of his passion in body and soul, his atoning sacrifice was sufficient to expiate the guilt of men universally.

To a tender Christian reverence it may seem offensive to question the soundness of the opinion that Christ endured sufferings in excess of the needs of the elect and of the whole race, or that by his death and passion He acquired vicarious merits indefinitely greater than violated justice demanded in order to open the way of forgiveness. But there is good reason for challenging it. The opinion involves consequences affecting both the character of God and the Christian conscience. The limits of this paper forbid a discussion of the elements of truth and error latent in it. One point only I shall notice. The doctrine intensifies the arbitrariness of the sovereign foreordination of some sinners to salvation and life, but especially the arbitrariness of the logical sequence that the virtue of the atonement is limited to the elect only. The value of the vicarious propitiatory sacrifice is sufficient for all men, even indefinitely greater than necessary to satisfy the demands of God's violated law, yet, according to the inscrutable counsel of his will, God, it was held, has limited the application of Christ's all-sufficiency to a definite number. Though more than sufficient for our guilty race, yet by an unconditional decree the benefits of the satisfaction made for sin by his death and passion do not appertain to any whom the decree has passed by. Sufficient for all, the infinite value of the sacrifice is not for all efficient.

The distinction between the sufficiency of the propitiatory sacrifice for all the individuals of the race and its efficiency, or the doctrine that Christ died *sufficenter pro omnibus, efficaciter pro electis*, as Calvin expresses it, proposes to vindicate God and enforce the guilt of sinners for rejecting the offer of salvation; yet in reality the all-sufficiency of an atonement which by an immutable purpose is designed for, and accessible to, only a definite number puts on the doctrine of a limited atonement relatively to the non-elect an edge of irony that stings and inflames the conscience.

2. The other defect in the doctrine of the atonement common to scholasticism and Reformation theology appears in the idea of satisfaction. Both assumed that the demands of God's violated law are satisfied by the suffering of the penalty of death. The transgressor is condemned, and must perish. There is no alternative, unless another, who is adequate to the exigency, bear the condemnation. If the condemnation be borne, or if payment be made to divine justice by the suffering of the penalties due the guilty, the law of God is satisfied, and the authority of his moral government is maintained.

There is no reason in the Christian doctrine of God nor in

sound Christian ethics to question either the validity of punitive justice, or the necessity of propitiation in order to salvation, or the teaching of the apostle that Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, so unequivocally confirmed by other portions of Scripture, or yet the soundness of the proposition that Christ has expiated human guilt. The necessity of suffering the penalties of wrong-doing is founded in the moral order of the world. But the doctrine that violated law, or God's justice, may be satisfied by Christ suffering the penalty of death, though containing an essential part of revealed truth, is incomplete; incomplete, because altogether negative.

The primary and essential demand of justice is positive. God requires that man *obey* his will. That will as expressed by his law is: *Thou shalt love*. To love is the general command. The objects of love are twofold: God and man. Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. The measure of love to God is *all the heart*. Of love to my neighbor the measure is true self-love. Self-love is true when rooted in loving God with all the heart. When I love God with all my heart I truly love myself. Such love is the fulfilling of the law. God imposes no other obligation. Love fulfills every command in the first table of the decalogue. Love fulfills every command in the second table. Love has no false god, worships no graven image, does not take the name of God in vain, keeps holy the Lord's day, honors father and mother, holds sacred human life, protects my neighbor in his rights of property, respects and guards his family, always confesses, honors, and speaks the truth, does not covet his honors or possessions, but is the enemy of selfishness, injustice, and wickedness. Such love and obedience man according to truth and justice owes to God. Obedience is in the proper sense his obligation.

Of right the obedience of love, nothing more nor less, is the positive claim of God and the positive necessity binding man. That this obligation of love and obedience be perfectly fulfilled is the unchangeable requirement of the divine law, and God's justice can really be satisfied by man in no other way than by actively responding to the requirement. The law of love is honored by the positive obedience of love. Apostasy does not change either the moral law or man's obligation. The prime necessity binding him when under condemnation is the same, positively, as the necessity binding him in his original state of righteousness. When the transgressor, either in his own person or in the Person

of the Head of the new race, thus fulfills the obligation of love he makes full payment of the positive debt due from him to God's justice. An adequate Redeemer is one who perfectly obeys God's law of love, and, in perfectly fulfilling this twofold law, at the same time accepts and bears all the penalties incurred by willful transgression, and pronounced by the violated law of love.

To suffer the penalties of transgression does not by itself honor God's law nor satisfy his justice. That man suffer and die is not God's will. This was not his will concerning the primeval family, nor is it his positive will now concerning the transgressor. The necessity of penalties is not latent either in God, or in human nature, or in the normal relationship between God and man. The death and the sufferings of sinners are contrary to God, contrary to his will of eternal love, and contrary to the intent of his moral government. His law is ordained unto love, and unto life. Transgression entails the penalty of death, because transgression contradicts the law of life, and violates the communion of love, and renounces the authority of law. But penalties do not meet positive requirements.

When the transgressor incurs the penalty of death, the suffering of the penalty does not annul falsehood, nor make wrong right, nor change evil into good, nor convert hatred into love. In the fallen economy of human history misery and death continue; continue through the ages on earth, and through the ages hereafter, not because inexpressible miseries and the horrors of death satisfy the law, but because the law is and must remain unsatisfied. The real claims of justice are only positive, the perfect obedience of love to God and love to man; therefore the divine law is not satisfied by any penalties which follow transgressions, however great or painful, or long continued. The primary obligation remains unpaid. Perpetual non-payment continues the judicial relations of the transgressor to the law of love the same, so long as the transgressor fails to fulfill the positive and unchangeable necessity: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.*

If man occupied his normal attitude toward God and lived a normal moral life, he would fulfill the whole obligation due from him to justice by loving God with all his heart and loving his neighbor as himself. But being morally perverse, and resting under condemnation for willful disobedience, the obligation which binds him is twofold, negative as well as positive. By the divine law of love he is required both to bear the penalty of transgression and to fulfill the unchangeable obligation of obedience. The

requisition of penalty is the reaction of love against hatred, of right against wrong, of truth against falsehood, — a reaction asserted in the ethico-religious nature of the transgressor and expressed by the peremptory decision of the conscience. Hatred to truth and right is a wrong involving the perversion and inversion of the moral order of humanity rooted in the righteousness of God. The necessary self-assertion of the moral order, or of the righteous economy of love, repels the hatred of good with unchangeable aversion, and condemns the violation of right with an unchangeable condemnation, a condemnation which the soul, at issue with itself, seizes and appropriates as its due.

Hence, as regards the transgressor, the demands of justice are met, not when he suffers the condemnation and wrath of God, nor, supposing this to be a possibility, if he should fulfill the positive obligations of love; but full payment is made to God's violated justice, or to the judicial demands of love, when its positive and negative requirements are both met, when man renders to God the perfect obedience of perfect love, and at the same time expiates the guilt entailed by transgression. Not the spotless righteousness of Jesus Christ, nor the suffering of God's curse in his death, neither by itself was, nor could be, the reconciliation between God and man; but the unity of both in his Person and work. By virtue of the perfect obedience of his perfect love in his life and on the cross, the suffering of God's condemnation resting upon the transgressor meets the whole demand of violated divine love, and becomes a true atonement.

The Reformation, by asserting, and in several particulars amending, the Anselmic theory, carried the doctrine concerning the atoning sacrifice forward to a higher plane of perfection than any on which it had ever before stood. Laying stress on the transgressor's false relation to God rather than on his bondage to Satan, on guilt instead of unholiness, on forgiveness instead of purification, and on an all-sufficient expiation of guilt by Christ suffering the penalties due the transgressor instead of self-mortification, the doctrine was specially suited to the ethical and religious wants of that age. But being exclusively negative, and ignoring the positive ethical factor in the Scriptural idea of atonement, it was only partially valid. The Reformation gave impulse to a moral and Christian life which in course of time calls for a different conception of our Lord's death, a conception which shall not contradict the necessity of propitiation, but shall supply the defect by incorporating the positive factor. The sufferings and death of Christ



derive expiatory virtue from his absolute obedience of love ; and his absolute obedience becomes an atonement in that of himself He lays down his life a sacrifice for sin.

## III.

The atoning sacrifice of Christ is correlative to justification. The benefits of his redemptive work accomplished by his passion and death are appropriated by the sinner in the exercise of faith. As the Reformation put emphasis on the work rather than on the Person of Christ, and, in the idea of satisfaction, on the suffering of the penalty to the exclusion of the obedience of love, justifying faith was directed, not immediately toward Christ himself, but to his vicarious sacrifice ; and not so much toward the sacrifice itself as fixed on the promise that God, on the ground of Christ's expiation, will forgive the sins of them that believe.

Having in considering the *material principle* reviewed the conception respecting the *object* of faith, I now return to the same subject in order to examine the Reformation doctrine of *justification*.

As to its essence, the doctrine is not only valid but a cardinal truth in sound soteriology. It has stood the test of review and criticism for three centuries ; and, rightly understood, it is now as it was then, what Luther called it, the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiæ*.

True Christian faith is man's response to Jesus Christ. Faith presupposes, in man, notwithstanding his fall and depravity, not only the necessity of a Mediator, but also his receptivity to the Christian redemption and his positive spiritual capacity of laying hold of Christ and appropriating Him. His receptive heart, under the plastic influence of the Holy Ghost active through the preaching of the gospel, may or may not open the door and give access to Christ. The spiritual capacity of appropriating Him when He addresses the heart may or may not become a real act of self-appropriation. Whether, when Christ knocks at the door, the guilty transgressor will hear the voice of grace and open his heart, or not, turns not on a divine decree, nor on irresistible grace, but on his own freedom of spiritual action. The exercise of faith certainly presupposes the positive agency of the Spirit of Christ through his word ; nevertheless the relation between the Holy Spirit and personal faith is not the relation of cause and effect. However necessary his divine agency, the act of man in believing is not the predicate of the Spirit.

According to the New Testament, two factors enter into personal salvation: the Saviour and the person by Him saved. When the native spiritual capacities of the soul are addressed by Christ, it is the undone transgressor who accepts or refuses Him. To believe is the predicate of man as really as to disbelieve. Whether he does the one or the other, the responsibility is with himself. If he accepts Christ, God approves the positive response of faith. If he rejects Christ, God condemns the negative response of unbelief. In either case the act is his own. Accepting Christ, he yields to the constraining agency of the Holy Ghost. Rejecting Christ, he withstands the Spirit by yielding to his inborn aversion to God.

The Reformation failed duly to recognize the human factor in personal salvation; personal faith being referred, not to the ethical capacity of the person believing, but chiefly, if not exclusively, to the will of God. This reference to the divine will of an act predicable of man alone followed from the prevalent doctrine concerning man and God. God was, at least in his relation to our fallen race, a sovereign monarch, who disposed of the disloyal subjects of his kingdom according to his own pleasure. Sinful men were rebels against God's authority. By transgressions committed against the divine Majesty they had forfeited all rights before his bar. Human nature had to so great a degree become depraved that all men alike were unreceptive to Christ, and incapable of appropriating his redemption. If any were to be saved, it was necessary that God of his grace work faith in them irresistibly. As none had any just claim to his clemency, it was right in the Sovereign Ruler to deal with all according to his good pleasure, and bestow the gift of faith on whomsoever He would.

This doctrine of God and man was intimately connected with the metaphysical principle of foreordination. From the mass of perdition a definite number of individuals had from all eternity been unconditionally chosen unto salvation. Unconditional election included all the steps in the history of the salvation of the elect: effectual calling, faith, repentance, sanctification, final perseverance. The end having been fixed and thus made certain according to the decree of election, and the sinner being wholly depraved and averse to God, his faith, like his effectual calling, was referable exclusively to electing grace. Those only did believe in Christ on whom God bestowed the gift of faith. The non-elect did not believe. Like the elect they had not the positive spiritual capacity. Thus, they did not believe because on them God did not effectually bestow the gift of faith. The difference



between believers and unbelievers was not due to any difference of natural character, nor to the difference of ethical response to the gracious approach of Christ, but it was referable to the sovereign discrimination of God, who according to his good pleasure wrought faith in some by his Spirit and did not effectually work faith in others. The believer was not himself a factor in the process of personal salvation; but his faith was a spiritual act of which sovereign grace was the sole author.<sup>1</sup>

According to this conception of faith the reason for the difference between believers and unbelievers is with God; not, indeed, that He is the author of the sinfulness of men; but God's discrimination is the cause of the fact that some accept Christ, whilst others, being left to themselves, do not; no account being made of the positive capacity of faith predicable of all. Moreover, the faith of the elect in Christ is not, at least in its incipient action, properly a predicate of their own personality. Being passive rather than receptive, and effectually wrought upon by God rather than themselves active toward Him, their faith becomes God's work, a work of which they are the subjects. God deals with ethical life as if it were unethical, with a person as if he were impersonal, with self-determining, self-acting spirit as if spirit were non-spiritual, with his prodigal son as if the paternal image had been effaced.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "That some receive the gift of faith from God, and others do not receive it, proceeds from God's eternal decree, 'For known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world' (Acts xv. 18; Eph. i. 11). According to which decree he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however obstinate, and inclines them to believe; while he leaves the non-elect in his just judgment to their own wickedness and obduracy." *Can. of Dort, First Head of Doctrine, Art. VI.*

<sup>2</sup> Says the Second Helvetic Confession: "Hæc autem fides merum est Dei donum, quod solus Deus ex gratia sua, electis suis, secundum mensuram, et quando, cui, et quantum ipse vult, donat, et quidem per Spiritum Sanctum, mediante prædicatione Evangelii, et oratione fidei. Hæc etiam sua habet incrementa; quæ nisi et ipsa darentur a Deo, non dixissent Apostoli: Domine, adauge nobis fidem" (Luke xvii. 5). Cap. xvi. 2. The Canons of the Synod of Dort are equally explicit: "Faith is therefore to be considered as the gift of God, not on account of its being offered by God to man, to be accepted or rejected at his pleasure, but because it is in reality conferred, breathed, and infused into him; nor even because God bestows the power or ability to believe, and then expects that man should, by the exercise of his own free will, consent to the terms of salvation, and actually believe in Christ; but because He who works in man both to will and to do, and indeed all things in all, produces both the will to believe and the act of believing also." Art. XIV., *Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine.*

Though faith be the work of God done in man, his rebellious subject, yet the justification obtained by faith, the effect of God's grace, was not positive and real, but negative and putative.

According to the Apostle Paul, the justification before God obtained by faith in Christ is positive no less than negative. Pertaining to transgression and guilt, justification also effects and includes the true attitude of the transgressor in his relation to the divine law. Accepting Christ, we have in Him freely the remission of the penalties of transgression. There is "no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." Precious as is this evangelical doctrine, it is nevertheless only a part of the truth. Justification includes much more than forgiveness. By faith in Christ we become positively righteous. We stand in the true ethical and judicial relation to God, and thus in Christ, or since we are by faith members of Christ, we are accepted and approved by God as having done, and as doing, the right.

Faith and sin are diametrically opposite; yet both are personal principles, and ethical activities. Sin transgresses all law; faith obeys the whole law of the gospel. Sin renounces Christ, and in Him rejects the absolute good; faith receives Christ, and in Him appropriates the absolute good. Sin asserts self against Christ, and thus thoroughly perverts God's love; faith freely surrenders self to Christ, and thus fulfills the law of love. Active according to the law of sin, the attitude and character of the unbeliever in his relation to God are abnormal, false, wrong, wicked. Active according to the law of faith, the attitude and character of the believer toward Christ, and in Christ toward God the Father, are normal, true, right, holy.

Disbelief is the root-sin; all other sins grow forth from it. The renunciation of God manifest in the flesh becomes the acme of iniquity. Those men only can be guilty of it who hear and reject the gospel. Faith in Christ, on the contrary, is the primary and fundamental act of obedience toward God. From this act of obedience the progress of the Christian life and its spiritual fruits are developed. Accepting Christ from the heart, and freely giving himself to Christ, the believer by this fundamentally right act yields to God the most real obedience. Yielding this central obedience by acknowledging Jesus Christ, the true God incarnate, the only propitiation for sin, the risen and glorified Lord, as the ground of forgiveness, the law for his will, and the ultimate end of his life, the believer in turn is by God not only pardoned, but also acknowledged and approved as occupying positively the right

attitude toward himself and the authority of his sovereign will. In other words, by yielding hearty obedience to the central command of the gospel, he does the one right act which is of the first order, and so far forth he is personally a right-doer. God does not deal with him merely on the ground of Christ's merits, but He deals with him as a member of Christ; not *as if* he were righteous when in reality he is not; but him, who by faith honors the Son, God, according to his word, regards as actually obedient to the primordial law of truth and right. There is no conscious act of the will more really and intensely right than the acknowledgment and appropriation of Christ, the light of the world, the living atonement, and the unchangeable law for heaven and earth. The disbelief of sin dishonors God and degrades man. The positive response of faith is worthy of man and honors God.

According to the doctrine of the Reformation, justification by faith was not positive. The believer did not become personally righteous. He was released from condemnation, freely receiving the forgiveness of all sins. The truth and preciousness of this negative conception of justification are certainly not to be questioned. But the conception is inadequate. Special pains was taken to deny the positive personal righteousness of faith; admitting only, or chiefly, the imputation of Christ's merits, or the righteousness of Christ, acquired by his passion and death. Christ's merits were set to the account of him that believes; and on the ground of this transfer he had forgiveness; but for fear of confounding justification with the Roman process of sanctification, the believer, it was held, had the assurance that the righteousness of Christ acquired by propitiatory suffering availed for his benefit, though there was no worthiness in believing. Personally or actually, faith did not make the believer righteous.

This inconsistency, that the believer has full forgiveness of sins, for Christ's sake, and yet is himself not really approved of God; that he is justified by faith and yet is himself not in the proper sense a just man; that in believing he obeys the central will of God, and yet that believing is destitute of all worthiness in God's sight, runs through the theology of the Reformed and Lutheran churches alike. If the rejection of the gospel, or the central wrong-doing, justly deserves God's condemnation and wrath, why may not the acceptance of Christ from the heart, or the central right-doing, justly deserve God's direct approval and commendation? On what sound principle can it be said that the obedience of faith in Christ is not morally good and acceptable to God, if,

nevertheless, we maintain that the disobedience of unbelief is wrong, and incurs God's wrath?

The error of Rome does not consist in ascribing merit to a good work, but in substituting a false obedience for the true obedience. Under the gospel dispensation, the only obedience of a sinner, which is the "work of God," is from the heart to believe in Him whom God has sent.<sup>1</sup> This is the first obligation, the fulfillment of which conditions the possibility of all other righteous acts. The works against which the Apostle Paul argues in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians are chiefly the observances of the ceremonial law, or an external obedience to the moral law, in opposition to the gospel, maintaining that the only righteousness of God, or the only right act approved of God, was the acceptance of his incarnate Son, Jesus Christ, as the only Lord and Saviour, in whom alone God was well pleased with men, inasmuch as those only who receive and obey his Son truly acknowledge God's authority and fulfill God's will. He does not in any passage teach or imply that when men obey the first command of the gospel they are not doing a right act, or that doing this right act they are not approved of God; the works which he condemns, and in which none may glory, being the false works of unbelief, or the ceremonial and moral works on which those rely who refuse to accept Jesus Christ as their life and redemption.

This denial of a positively right attitude before God to the believer arises from the fact that, according to the Reformation doctrine, faith was directed toward the work rather than the Person of Christ, and fixed upon the negative rather than the positive reality of his work, and then not so much upon his objective passion and death as upon the proposition that God on account of Christ's passion and death had promised to forgive sins. Obviously the mere subjective act of believing, or an abstract moral exercise, is not meritorious. It is also difficult to see how the acceptance of a proposition, however true and evangelical, is ethically good, or can be a right act of the will toward God. But if faith passes from a proposition to the objective passion, from the passion to the positive life of love asserted in all his sufferings, and from his whole work to his divine human Person as the central object, then faith, acknowledging Him, appropriating Him, yielding self wholly to Him, freely binds the soul to Christ as the author of the new life, the Mediator between God and the transgressor, the only ground of forgiveness, and becomes a positive

<sup>1</sup> John vi. 29.

ethical act, the principle of a new manhood, than which no act, no principle, is more really worthy of a man, and yet none more completely divests him of all forms of false self-righteousness.

Nevertheless, though faith was directed to an evangelical proposition instead of the personal Christ, though justification was negative more than positive, and though the truest obedience possessed no merit, yet the Reformation doctrine of justification involved a valid principle, rich in peace and freedom, in hope and strength, that carried the Evangelical Church forward to a stage of Christian life and Christian civilization, radically dissimilar to the bondage of fear, the religion of ceremonial service, and the morality of arbitrary commands, which had enslaved the mediæval Roman Church.

#### IV.

As in the prevalent conception of Christian faith and the doctrine of justification commonly maintained by the Reformation, so in the idea of personal religion, or of the spiritual history and experiences of the Christian, the negative aspect was more prominent than the positive, and the divine factor more emphatic than the human factor.

Denying man's capacity for positive response to the action of God's grace, and failing to see the necessity of such free response for the formation of personal Christian character, the efficiency of grace was regarded as unconditional. The rejection of Christ and a persistent course of impenitence were attributable to moral perverseness, but the acceptance of Christ and persistence in his faithful service were due solely to the irresistible will of God's sovereign grace. Final salvation does not in any sense turn on the activity of human freedom.

Rome taught that the sacraments conferred benefits *ex opere operato*. The proper external observance had saving virtue, the state of the heart and the activity of the will of the subject not being a condition of their efficacy. Justly rejecting this magical theory, the Reformers nevertheless adhered to the underlying principle; but the principle was transferred from the Pope to God, from the church to the Holy Ghost, from the sacraments to the Word; the nature of ethical life and the personal conditions of efficacious grace being either denied or ignored in Reformation as in Roman theology.

Man being essentially ethical and spiritual, either good or evil, addressing him from without or from the abyss of his fallen nature, can enter into his personal history and become a formative force



in his personal character only by the self-determined activity of his own will. A stone or a block, being neither vital nor ethical, may without the destruction of its material be shaped at will by the skill of an artist. A plant or an animal, being organic, but neither ethical nor religious, may be trained and improved, if the training conform to the laws and conditions of vegetable or animal life, according to human judgment and will. Should the culture of a plant proceed on the presumption that, like a stone, it is passive and unresponsive, or that its parts are held together by the force of mineral laws, obviously such culture would be an abuse that would end only in the extinction of life. But of man the chief characteristic is, not that he has an animal nature, much less that he is a mineral organization, but that he is *spirit*, a finite spirit, the unity of rational and ethico-religious life. A personal being, he is within himself an empire in which and over which he alone is monarch. Over this realm his authority is indisputable and final. When he opens the gates the good may enter in and abide, whether it approach him from earth or from heaven. When against the good he locks the gate the good is barred out, whether it stand and knock in the name of man or of God. Thus the Creator has formed him, that, being Godlike, he might freely live in the communion of love with God. A sovereign, by the creative word, over the kingdom of his individual personality as really as the Creator is the universal sovereign, he is able by a Godlike service to manifest forth the divine glory, or by renouncing the Creator to antagonize all authority, violate all laws, natural, human, and divine. Endowed with this unique constitution, distorted and perverted by sin, but not extinct, God deals with him in his self-perversion and guilt, whether in the way of condemnation or pardon, and can deal only according to the conditions of spiritual autonomy.

A salvation that would approach personality as the husbandman approaches the vine, or the mason the granite block, in order by the exercise of the sovereign almightiness of grace radically to change moral and spiritual character, regardless of the free affirmation or free negation of man's own will, would not be a recovery from moral evil, but would itself be a violence done to personality as thorough as the wrong inflicted by willful disobedience. The doctrine of such a salvation is as really magical as the notion that by a word or the wave of the hand a rock may be changed into a statue, or an animal into a man. In either case the presumption disregards the intrinsic conditions of transformation in the nature of the subject.

In the doctrine of personal religion, as taught by Reformation theology, there is another phase which, though implied in what has just been said, ought to be particularly noted. Though effectual calling, saving faith, and final perseverance are attributable to God alone, yet personal religion is wanting in positiveness.

Corresponding to the Augustinian redemption theory of Christianity, personal religion in the Roman Church was personal salvation, or a deliverance from the stains and penalties of sin. Scholasticism did not, and could not, consistently with the Roman doctrine concerning the church, recognize the life-communion of love with Christ glorified in the Spirit, either as fundamental to or coördinate with deliverance from moral evil. This defect, in spite of the faith-principle, which renounced the mediatorship of the saints and of the hierarchy and affirmed a more direct relation between the believer and Christ's redemptive work, was not supplied by the Reformation. Instead, as the Augustinian theory survived the convulsions of the crisis, the idea that Christianity was essentially a redemption, and personal religion a work of salvation, reigned in the construction of Reformation doctrines. In this respect there is but little difference between the theology of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. True, emphasis was put on the new birth, on Christian life, and on the life everlasting. But the new birth was in order to deliverance from the consequences of the fall. The Christian life was the spiritual experience and the ethical conduct, or the good works, which were the fruit of justifying faith. The life everlasting was the life of blessedness in heaven. Nor was the belief in a mystical union between Christ and his people, as between the Head and the members of his body, altogether wanting either in the confessions or in theology. Indeed, special stress was laid on the mystical union by some theologians; but the mystical union was not a dominant force, nor was it regulative in the reigning idea of personal religion. The mystical union in the degree in which it was accepted was a gift of grace enjoyed by the elect, who had been effectually called, and in whom the work of sanctification was in progress. Thus some positive elements did enter into personal religion; yet both the conception of religion and Christian experience were predominantly negative; the spiritual history of the Christian being principally a process of deliverance from the evils of sin.

Nor could either spiritual experience or the conception of personal religion consistently be otherwise. As Christ and his work were chiefly redemptive, and Christianity was as to its essential



nature a remedial system, it was legitimate that the personal history and experience of the believer derive its principal characteristics from his relation to moral evil. Sin being the point of observation from which the objective facts of revelation were construed, sin also became the force that gave tone and coloring to the experiences and practical conduct of Christian people.

But is not Jesus Christ the Redeemer? Was not his death a propitiatory sacrifice for sin? Is not sin the evil of all evils? Is not the personal history of the Christian a perpetual warfare with the flesh, the world, and the devil? Are not forgiveness, perseverance in the conflict, and progressive sanctification cardinal necessities? Was not the judgment of mediæval scholasticism and of Reformation theology regarding the miseries of our fallen race sound?

On these questions there is, in the light of Scripture and experience, ground for but one answer: Christ is the Redeemer; Christianity is the only true redemption; and personal religion includes a process of personal salvation. Yet inexpressibly great as is the blessing of the Christian religion in its relation to sin, this is but one aspect of it. Christ is also the second Adam, the complement and perfection of the primeval man. Christianity is in Christ the final life-communion between man and God. Personal religion is the positive fellowship of love in the Spirit with Christ glorified. To say the least, Christ the perfection of manhood, and Christ the Redeemer; life, and salvation; the reciprocal fellowship of love between Christ and the Christian, and the Christian's warfare with the dark powers of sin; or the positive and negative factors of true religion, are coördinate.

Yet in truth, here as elsewhere, the positive conditions the negative. The human aptitude in the being of God for vital union with man, and the divine aptitude in man for vital union with God, or the ethical unity of divine life with human life in the Person of Jesus, conditions the possibility of the redemption of our race from sin. The inborn positive capacity of the transgressor for a new birth into the kingdom of God by the Spirit of Christ conditions the possibility of the forgiveness of sins and of sanctification. The reciprocal life-communion in the Mediator between the Father and his regenerate children conditions the possibility of the victorious warfare with all forms of moral evil.

In personal religion the positive factor is related to the negative factor, the reciprocal life-communion of love with Christ to deliverance from moral evil, somewhat as in the earthly history of

men the vitality of the body is related to disease. The recovery from sickness depends on the vital forces of our physical constitution. Success in resisting temptation and in overcoming the evil tendencies of our inherited sinfulness depends on spiritual vitality; and spiritual vitality grows in vigor, not so much by reflection on wrong as by doing the right, not so much by bewailing our faults as by constant fellowship with the Lord.

A former age combated the numberless diseases to which we are heir by antidotes. Physicians fought evil with evil. Our age is reversing the order. Attention has been directed to the positive resources of the bodily organism; and the comparatively new sciences of hygiene and sanitation are now in process of development. To maintain and improve the public health, our age is studying and enforcing the laws of health, and thus by invigorating the body is surmounting the danger of sickness; by the nourishment of life is postponing death. The principle of positive spiritual life, as distinguished from reflection on our faults and from the constant conflict with moral evil, performs a function in the normal history of the church and of individual Christians, resembling the function performed by the hygienic principle in mental and bodily health.

Like Romanism, the Reformation was chiefly concerned with methods for the recovery of man from the evils of sin, and like that system failed to emphasize, in a degree answering to the nature of Christianity, the life-communion of Christ glorified with his members, also the spiritual capacities of his members for such life-communion. The Reformation did not perfect the Roman idea of the Christian religion by asserting and developing its positive complement; but its great superiority turns on its more evangelical conceptions of redemption. Like Romanism, Protestantism is principally concerned with sin.

This falsely predominant negative conception of personal religion entered into symbols and confessions, into Reformed and Lutheran theologies, and has by inheritance descended through successive generations for three centuries down to our time. Even now no practical error is more common than the axiom that in order to gain a man for Christ it is necessary to begin with sin; as if Christ, the highest good, were not more potent to draw the natural man to himself from all evil than sin is to excite a reaction from sin toward Christ. In the matter of personal religion, the health and vigor of the church require the consistent recognition of spiritual hygiene, the principle which underlies and complements

the saving virtue of the gospel; both regeneration and repentance, life and salvation, organic growth and sanctification, being taught with equal clearness and explicitness by our Lord and his apostles.

Toward Reformation theology, notwithstanding its deficiencies, the evangelical theologians of our age may not with logical consistency occupy an attitude of antagonism or contradiction. The Reformers were men of gigantic strength, who labored agreeably to the laws of history and the genius of the age. The fruits of their theological activity were an inestimable blessing. A rich legacy was by them bequeathed to succeeding centuries. On nearly all points the doctrines which they inherited, modified, and advanced possess valid and important elements. But Augustinian ideas were broader, deeper forces in their theological conflicts than their own new principles. Their labors resulted in decided progress, not in a final system. Of the freedom for which they contended we are the heirs; and it becomes us to honor it by improving our inheritance. What the evangelical churches of our age call for is a two-fold positive work: first, to reassert and consistently apply, in the true Reformation sense, the Scripture principle; and, secondly, in the clearer light of the Word of God, with the aids afforded by the progress of Biblical knowledge, of ethical philosophy, and sound dogmatic thought, to complement the doctrines of the Reformation, not so much by further reflection on moral evil as by affirming and developing, agreeably to the *whole* teaching of the New Testament, the Christological principle, or the positive truth of Christianity central in the divine-human personality of our Lord Jesus Christ.

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## SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE PULPIT.

### SERMON II. USE AND ABUSE OF CAPITAL.

What profit hath a man of all his labor which he taketh under the sun?  
*Ecc. i. 3.*

SUPPOSE that the machinery of a steamship is not working as smoothly as might be wished. The screw at one moment tears the water, at another barely serves to keep steerage-way upon the ship. The engine frets and grinds. Different persons who

are concerned in the safety and progress of the ship may be conceived as regarding that laboring machinery in the following ways: One person might say to himself and a few others, "Things cannot run on long in this way without disaster; let us secure the life-preservers, and when the disaster which must come shall come, we will look out for ourselves and divide whatever we may find left of the cargo upon the rocks." A second person might say, "It is true things are not working as well as they might; there is an occasional chafing and grinding; but we have always had good luck thus far, and so long as there is no immediate danger ahead we shall not borrow trouble, but continue dancing in the cabin." A third person of that ship's crew might be conceived as looking into the engine-room, and delivering a discourse upon the perfect engine of the future. He might claim that disaster is only a question of time unless the present kind of engine, with its thrust back and forth between two dead points, can be transformed into the perfect rotary engine of his ideal. But the fourth man, of practical common sense as well as of good will to all his fellow-passengers, would quietly observe the engine at its work; notice what journals were heating, upon what bearings were thrown excessive strains, where waste of power might be stopped, or a little oil would prevent friction. I have been describing in these words the positions of different people towards the present constitution of society, and the progress of mankind. The first man mentioned, who watches eagerly for the hour when society shall go to pieces, and the spoils after the wreck be divided, is the anarchist. He would be willing to see innocent persons drown, provided the rich cargo of civilization shall be redistributed. The second person represents the easy, indifferent class of citizens. Occasionally their nerves may be disturbed by some unusually violent jarring of the social machinery, but ordinarily they do not care. When thrown into momentary alarm they become violent in their expressions concerning what needs to be done. In the case of these two classes, the anarchists and the social indifferentists, we have another illustration of the old adage that extremes meet; for neither of them is a helper to human progress, and both alike, although from opposite quarters, furnish material for future civil disorder and disaster. Social indifferentism on the part of the good is so much dry fuel for the sparks of the bad. Read any of the papers of the social democrats, and you can hardly fail to notice how the indifferentism of the rich or the educated becomes a weapon in their hands for the excitement of

popular prejudice and passion. The effect of social indifferentism among those who ought to be interested in all social progress is indeed more to be dreaded than the possible acts of a handful of wild schemers, or criminal triflers with dynamite.

The third person in my comparison, the man with the plan of a perfect rotary engine in his head, into which he would transform piece by piece the existing machinery, represents the socialist pure and simple.<sup>1</sup> He has an idea of the "coöperative commonwealth," which shall work without any dead points in the distribution of social force, in which all jarring and friction between different parts of society shall be reduced to an almost inappreciable minimum, if indeed he has not at last discovered the secret of perpetual social motion. "We socialists have been born in the world," says Mr. Gronlund, "a guarantee that society will go forward, not backward." Several years ago I saw what was claimed to be a fulfillment of that dream of mechanics, the perfect rotary engine. Even to my unskilled eye, however, there were noticeable points of waste and future trouble in its working; but I was serenely told that measures were being devised to prevent the difficulties. I have since neither heard of that engine nor of the fortune which was to be reaped from it. The "coöperative commonwealth," or, as I should call it, the perfect rotary social engine, is beyond the powers of human nature. Only Omniscience could construct it or work it.

The fourth and last person of my parable is the man who is neither frightened nor indifferent, nor alternately alarmed and careless; he has no fine scheme; he simply tries to determine the points of grinding and waste, to locate evils, and to do what he can to make things work together for good in this world.

Last Sunday I closed with an enumeration of alleged industrial evils and dangers. The next thing for us to do, if we would have the wisdom of the practical social engineer, is to locate these evils as closely as we can. But in the attempt to locate existing evils

<sup>1</sup> The socialist expects social revolution through social evolution. Lassalle in his *Workingman's Programme* said: "One can never make a revolution." Karl Marx, the philosopher as well as organizer of the International, in the preface to his *Das Kapital* (p. 6), said that from his point of view he conceived of the economical formation of society as a process in natural history. He claimed that his agitation only hastened the inevitable. Anarchists, catching his philosophic tone, have assured me that they are not inciting revolution, but preparing the people for the revolution which they see is sure to come ere long of itself! But Lassalle said that one or two centuries count as an hour in this universal historical sunrise.

precisely, we shall have to part company with the mere social declaimer, and the whole tribe of political demagogues. Before thinking of remedies we should seek to discover exactly where in our present complex industrial machinery the dead points are. This problem of the location of social waste and woes we may approach from two different directions — the purely economical and the moral; and we should rest satisfied with no conclusions in which both lines of investigation do not meet. The economist takes up these questions as a pure social mathematician; he has to figure out in terms of value the equations of human life. Men, women, and children, for the time being, may be to him simply as the letters  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$ , in his problem of industrial figures and forces. Then the social philosopher takes up the worked-out values of the economist's tables, and the figures live before his eye with human interest. He comes from the homes of men, and he must interpret the values of the economist in terms of human happiness or want. The social philosopher, the Christian friend of men, must accept the statistical facts; he shall not violate in his philanthropy the social laws to be deduced from them; but he will bring to the question, and carry through its discussion, the instincts of justice and the sympathies of humanity, and he will never rest satisfied with any existing status in which mercy and truth are not met together.

It is not my duty as a preacher of the gospel to teach economic science; but it is the duty of the ministers and disciples of Him who had compassion on the multitude to apply economic science in their teachings and lives to the needs of men in this present life.

In order that we may locate more definitely the evils alleged, let us first be sure that we do not exaggerate them. We shall find wrongs enough in the world to be righted without any exaggeration of the evil tendencies of things. Mr. Henry George, with a sincerity which is pathetic, wrote a book in which he assumed that progress is causing poverty, that wealth is gained at the cost of increasing poverty. The fact that this book has had a sale which, above that of any other recent book, might be compared with the first sale of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" indicates the extent of the existing feeling of discontent with the results of modern civilization. Many hopes of humanity have been disappointed in the apparent results of the industrial revolution wrought by machinery. But now the economists and statisticians are following closely after Mr. George, and they prove that his fundamental assumption that in-



crease of wealth has been accompanied by increase of poverty is an illusion. Mr. Rae<sup>1</sup> shows by careful statistical comparisons that Mr. George has made the mistake which a traveler might make who should look out of the window of a rapidly moving train, and conclude that a train advancing more slowly on a parallel track was going backwards, and then should coil himself up in the corner of his car and evolve the reason from his own thoughts. Notwithstanding the fact that the diffusion of the gain of civilization has not been as general as we might wish, still, according to the same authority, these two statements can be proved of the condition of the laboring class in England: first, that the standard of living has advanced; and secondly, that the proportion of the population who are not able to rise to the improved standard of living has diminished. Now, for instance, to be without a pair of shoes would be a mark of extreme indigence; it was the common lot a century ago. And notwithstanding the tendency to monopolies, the statistics show that in England the number of moderate fortunes and incomes has increased, and on the whole the rate of wages during this century has risen rather than fallen.<sup>2</sup> It is a general social gain if men are coming to feel the pinch of poverty higher up on the scale of the necessities of existence. Wages cannot long be kept down below the point marked necessary to life on the common social standard.

<sup>1</sup> *Contemporary Socialism*, pp. 386 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See, also, Mallock, *Property and Progress*, chapter on *The Statistics of Agitation*. Karl Marx held that in the process of social evolution the middle class is a vanishing quantity, and society is rapidly becoming divided into two classes, the very rich, who are few, and the proletariat. Hence the inevitable conflict. But the facts contradict his theory. "We find," says Mr. Mallock, "that each family, amongst the poorer classes in England, had in 1843 about £40 a year, that in 1851 it had £58, and that at the present time it has between £95 and £100; that is to say, the incomes of those who have less than £150 a year have increased during the last forty years by 130 per cent." *Ibid.*, p. 203. "We find further, if we except the handful of men—not more than 987 in all—whose incomes are above £10,000, and who have grown richer individually as well as more numerous, that, whilst the middle classes have been growing richer individually likewise, the bulk of the rich have been growing individually poorer. Thus, the average income in the lowest grade of the middle class was £164 in 1851, and is £171 now; whilst the average income amongst all the rich, except the very rich, was, in 1881, £2193, and it is now not more than £2069" (p. 211). For further corroborative statistics, see Mr. Robert Giffon's valuable address on *The Progress of the Working Classes in the Last Half Century*. By an examination of the probate records, as well as the income tax returns, he shows that wealth of late years tends to diffuse itself among a greater number, and that by far the largest share of the great material improvement of the last fifty years has gone to the masses.

Similar facts appear in the report on "The Factory System," in the tenth census of the United States. Mr. Wright there maintains, by statistics which I will not weary you with citing, that the present factory system on the whole has been an improvement over the domestic system which it has displaced; that it has nearly doubled the rate of wages, reduced the hours of labor, and diminished the cost of goods. Still another statistician,<sup>1</sup> after making a series of comparisons between rates of wages and products for several periods, maintains that increasing production under the principle of free competition tends to raise both the rate and purchasing power of wages, and to diminish the relative share of the total product to be set down to profits. Mr. Gronlund, like other socialistic writers, greatly overestimates the profits of business, setting down the surplus for the year 1880 as 48½ per cent. of the "net produce of all manufacturing industries of the United States," which he regards as so much *fleeced* from labor. Mr. Edward Atkinson, however, after a careful study of the returns, and having included in his estimates all gainful occupations and the total annual product of the United States, expresses the profound conviction that "in a normal year, under normal conditions, not exceeding ten per cent. can be set aside as either rent, interest, profit, or savings; and that nine tenths constitutes the share of the laborer, which, by subdivision, becomes expressed in terms of personal wages." Half of that ten per cent. of profit he assigns to capital, and half to the savings of those who do the work of production or distribution.<sup>2</sup> I do not care to linger, however, upon these facts and figures; I adduce them not in defense of anything questionable or wrong in the present distribution of things, but as facts which should enter into a fair estimation of the present tendencies of our industrial system. These are enough to prevent anarchic despair of it. These and similar facts and statements which might be cited are enough to serve as an antidote to that pessimistic view of civilization which may be occasioned by an empty stomach, or a jaundiced mind.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Edward Atkinson, *The Distribution of Products*.

<sup>2</sup> This estimate of profits has been criticised as too low; but the current rate of interest does not indicate that capital is able to secure a much larger rate of return when employed in industries.

<sup>3</sup> So many loose statements are current concerning the comparative rates of wages and cost of living that I add the following statistics: "In 1860 the average yearly wages for all, men, women, and children, was \$196+; in 1880 it was \$244—" (*Tenth Census*, vol. ii., *Report on the Factory System of the United States*, p. 51). "Wages in Massachusetts are 28.36 per cent. higher

Just at this point let us seek to locate as nearly as we can a general complaint among socialists concerning the present unequal distribution of the products of labor. One of the workingmen of this city says that the ministers, in what I presume he would call the capitalized pulpit, will not dare take up this question. I confess that nowhere in all this complex subject have I sought more eagerly for some determining principle than upon this very point. Amid the great inequalities of wealth is there any rule by which to every man might be divided his fair share? In the town of Stoke, England, a large manufacturer once took me through his works and showed me the whole process by which the finest modern Etruscan ware is produced. I saw at one end the clay in the workman's hand, at the other end the exquisite ware. The manufacturer said he had often thought of writing a history of those vases, and he proceeded to mention the different kind of materials and labor which had entered into that rare product of art. All quarters of the globe, and divers kinds of labor, were represented in the worth of that vase. Now who could tell the exact share of each in that product? Economics gives us no measuring-rod fine enough to determine the share of each human muscle and each human mind, and each quantity and quality of human force, expended in the production of that costly vase.

Take a yard of common cotton cloth, and endeavor with your than they were in 1860" (*Mass. Report on the Statistics of Labor*, 1884, p. 432). The following tables, compiled from the same Report, indicate the relation between rates of wages and the cost of the chief necessities of life for recent periods. The percentages of increase or decrease are given, and are marked + and — respectively:—

Years.	Groceries.	Provisions.	Fuel.
1860-83 . . . .	+10.01	+35.30	+ 9.79
1872-83 . . . .	-16.81	-10.16	-29.22

Years.	Wages.
1860-83 . . . .	+28.36
1872-83 . . . .	- 5.41

Mr. Thorold Rogers states (*Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 504) that, in the period 1800-20, wages were to the cost of food as 55.25 : 232.5, the first figure being the daily wages in pence, and the second the aggregate cost in shillings of seven chief necessities. In the period 1821-40 wages were 62.75, and the same articles cost only 146.35; wages had risen, the prices of necessities fallen. Mr. Wright, in the *Report on the Factory System* already quoted, remarks (p. 51): "An examination of the British Tables will convince one that for most divisions of labor in cotton factories wages have very nearly doubled during the past half century." Mr. Giffon states that "the mean of the percentages of increase is over 70" in the wages of the occupations which he has compared.

scissors to divide that yard of cloth into strips, each one of which shall represent the fair share of each kind of labor, thought, management, and interests of all sorts, which are woven together in its production. Take that cloth from the hand of the clerk in the store, or receive it from the errand boy, who must have some thread of it to represent his share, and try to divide it fairly in the interest of all, from the hands on the cotton field to the last man who had anything to do with its production or final location in your house; and you could more easily disentangle the threads of which it is woven than unravel that combination of labor both of muscle and mind in its production. What omniscience shall determine the fair share of each in the product of the grand totality of human labor? Economics does not undertake an impossible task. It simply throws all alike back upon the rough justice of human averages, and approximates each man's portion in general terms of supply and demand.

Look again at the same intricate problem from the moral point of view. Is there any moral law of profits easy to be applied and always fair? Many a high-minded man would rejoice if he could find in his business such a law. But who can devise a hard and fast rule for the determination of his rightful interest in every business transaction? I have searched the writings of many socialists, and have found not one shadow even of a ray of candle-light in them upon this question. Simple equalization would be simple injustice. You can reduce a wheat-field to a dead level by cutting down all the wheat; God's living chemistry gives to each sheaf its own size and height. No hard and fast rule, I say, can be formulated; but a general principle, I think, may be used by us all as a guide. I would venture to propound the following, not as a rule, but as a regulative principle of all human labor: Every man according to his means should be a producer, and the ratio of his production above his consumption should increase directly with the increase of his means above the average level of human production. Understand by the word "means" all power of work in its largest sense,—health, brains, muscle, capital,—and by the word "production" understand whatever makes, directs, or diffuses good,—and the maxim is of universal validity. For example, the average rate of production of wealth in the United States has been estimated to be about fifty cents per day for each person. If a man receives one dollar, ten dollars, a hundred, a thousand dollars income per day, his productive obligation, his ratio of responsibility and service to the whole, rises morally directly in that

proportion. Whether rich or poor, if he does not use his means productively in due proportion, he is morally on the wrong side; we justly call him miserly. So much for our fair share in the products. You will find this principle in its simplest form in Christ's parable of the talents.

Let us next seek to locate the evil in the general complaint of a conflict between labor and capital. In order that we may not be lost in generalities, let me put the subject before you in a single concrete instance. I shall seek accordingly to determine what, if any, conflict there is between labor and capital in a single loaf of bread. I shall search for the percentage of social wrong in the history of a loaf of bread. The example is fairly chosen, for if our present industrial system of production and distribution breaks down badly in the case of a loaf of bread, it breaks down at a vital point.

Mr. Edward Atkinson has shown that this modern miracle has been wrought: By the aid of machinery, wheat enough to make one thousand barrels of flour can be raised in Dakota, milled, laid down in New York, converted into bread enough for the annual ration of 1,000 people, baked and served, all at the equivalent of the annual labor of seven men; "seven persons serve one thousand with bread." What has wrought this modern miracle? What did it? If, according to the anarchist's scheme, every town or commune between New York and the wheat fields of Dakota owned each its mile or two of railway, corn would be cheaper for fire-wood on the western prairies than for food in New York. What has wrought this great thing for us all? I do not ask who did it—for my argument is not to be prejudiced by the mention of a name—but what has done it? Plainly enough capital; yet not capital of itself. The accumulated savings of a country might have been unemployed, might have been left to rot in paper money. What is the money, or capital, recently taken by frightened people from our savings bank doing now for the general productiveness? Not capital of itself, then, but capital massed like the troops of an army for a purpose, capital intelligently using machinery for a great end, has wrought this modern miracle. In the "Saint's Tragedy," a story of the Middle Ages, a mob is represented as gathered around the gateway of a castle, and crying, "Bread! Bread! Bread! Give us bread; we perish." A merchant appears with mules laden with corn. But "the scoundrel wants three times its value." He says:—

"Not a penny less—

I bought it on speculation—I must live—



I get my bread by buying corn that 's cheap,  
And selling where 't is dearest. Mass, you need it,  
And you must pay according to your need."

The existence, then, of capital as a power which may be used for larger distribution of wheat is not the evil we are looking for; we should clearly gain nothing by going back to the merchant's mules.<sup>1</sup> But do the merchant's extortions remain, and are they multiplied by the increase of power of capital in the exchange of locomotives for mules? How much extortion, then, I ask, is ordinarily to be found in a modern loaf of bread? How large a slice must we cut off to represent unjust profits, or economic waste? Mr. Atkinson has analyzed the cost of bread in all stages of the process from the wheat field of Dakota to the consumer in New York. The profit of railway transportation on each pound of bread is  $\frac{1}{1000}$  of a cent. The cost of local production and distribution, the share of small bakeries and grocer's wagons in that loaf, exceeds the cost of transportation from Dakota to New York.<sup>2</sup> Observe, I do not say, for I do not know, that in this long process from the wheat-field to the mouth of the consumer there may not still be at some point, perhaps at several points, excessive charges for service rendered, or preventable economic waste; but the figures, which I will not cite in detail, show that with all its sins and corruptions civilization, with its eager eyes of competition, is reducing this margin of the old merchant's extortion in the tragedy to small fractions, and although there may be social injustice still lurking in the loaf of modern bread, we must search for it in the crumbs. Yet even these are worth gathering up! Did not the Lord Christ bid his disciples gather up the fragments that nothing be lost?

Let us proceed still further with our endeavor to locate wrongs. We have just seen that not capital, or combination of capital for service, is of itself an evil; that whatever evil may exist must be located not in the use, but in some abuse, of the means of society.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Giffen, *Progress of the Working Classes*, p. 11, calls attention to the important fact that the fluctuations in the price of wheat in the earlier decades of this century were extreme and disastrous, while of late years there has been a steadily low price in England. "Fifty years ago, the workingman, with wages on the average about half, or not much more than half, what they are now, had at times to contend with a fluctuation in the price of bread which implied sheer starvation."

<sup>2</sup> "The whole railway service, from the field to the baker's oven, costs but half a cent per pound, but the service of the baker, and the grocer, and the shopman, costs  $2\frac{1}{4}$  to 4 cents per pound of bread." *The Distribution of Products*, p. 295.



Upon what, then, I ask next, are these possible, and indeed often actual, abuses of capital to be located? The socialists are quick to reply, They grow directly out of the private ownership of the means of civilization, and the principle of competition. What, then, exactly is the evil, the social danger, in a monopoly? It does not lie necessarily in the possession of power by any man or body of men to render service to the state. It is simply, in the last analysis, the evil of the few serving their own interest, and the danger that their service of themselves will injure the many. The danger is that with the growth of power the temptation to use it tyrannically—for the sole benefit, that is, of a class—will become too great for human virtue. The post office, for example, is a great government monopoly, but as it serves the people and not the class of office-holders exclusively, there is no particular prejudice against it. Mormonism, on the contrary, is an example of a harmful monopoly, a land monopoly, dangerous as the power of a class against the welfare of the whole country. That there is danger of large private corporations swallowing up smaller ones to the possible injury of the whole community no man will deny. But put the evil where it belongs,—in the abuses of power which are possible in a complex civilization,—and not where it does not belong,—upon the right of every man to earn what he can, and to keep what he can get. I had written a brief statement of the principles upon which individual ownership of the tools and capital of industry rest, but I omit it, as the time has not come in this country when one need defend the right of private ownership of property. Yet as against the individual, and harmful combinations of individuals, the socialist is not wholly wrong, although he strikes blindly at a sacred principle, for no man has absolute ownership of anything in this world without any limitations or obligations to his fellow-men. The state has rights of eminent domain. And against threatening combinations of capital, or harmful speculations, corners, and class-monopolies, society certainly has human rights, and the state may find legal methods of self-protection. As for the principle of competition, which is a natural correlate of the right of private property, suffice it to say that it would be a dull world without it. Ambition may assume satanic forms, but emulation I could conceive as animating even the angelic hosts on their errands of peace and good will. I challenge the assumption that competition is necessarily evil, and that all modern business is consequently based upon selfishness, and from its nature destructive of justice and humanity. As a Christian man I do not believe

in any communistic heaven, either in this world or the world to come, where there shall be a constant monotony of song, and every saint shall be fed and surfeited out of a government spoon. As a disciple of that manliest of men, who went about doing good, I believe in a manly heaven of manly service through the eternal ages.

Now let me carry this endeavor to locate social evils just one step further, and I shall have done for to-day. We have seen thus far that we cannot locate admitted evils or threatening industrial dangers either in the existence of capital or in the right of individual property and its correlate principle of competition, but must find it in abuses of these fundamental functions of organized social life. Where, then, shall we find their root and source? Take again that loaf of bread.

Suppose certain men meet in a grain-broker's office in Chicago. They are intelligent men. Sometimes they have been poor; sometimes they have been rich; but whether they are rich or poor, every man who does business with them seems to become poorer for the contact with them. These men, a few of them, take counsel together. They have a right to do so. But as the result of that meeting and counsel we will suppose the next day the price of wheat goes up, and as a result of that speculative rise some poor widow in a far-off manufacturing village eats less bread<sup>1</sup> herself that she may have more to give to her children. Such things may have happened.<sup>1</sup> There is wrong done, and as the count in the "Saint's Tragedy" wanted to borrow a halter for the merchant from his mules, so would any generous friend of humanity like to see those men hoisted with their own petard. But keep to our analysis, and our endeavor to locate evil. It will never do in wild wrath to seek to put dynamite under the whole arch and framework of justice and blow up our own sky for the sake of annihilating wrong from the face of the earth. What is the last cause of that corner in wheat? Who has done this evil thing? Every man of you knows who has done it. It was the devil in men. It

<sup>1</sup> It has been questioned how far corners in wheat affect retail prices. The wholesale price of flour is said to have varied more than 50% in recent corners in wheat. In an article on "The Corner of 1879," in the *North American Review*, Aug., 1883, we read that "three out of every four flouring mills of the country were kept idle for over two months. . . . The price of pork was more than doubled, flour was put up an average of two dollars a barrel, and beefsteak at least one cent a pound, as the result of these manipulations. . . . Every moment the corner lasts there is a mouthful of food the less for the laboring man." Good witnesses, however, differ as to how far the effects of a corner in wheat extend usually beyond the middlemen to the points of consumption.

was satanic greed in those men's hearts which did it. It was not capital; it was not the law of private property; it was not the principle of competition; it was the hard, reckless, hellish selfishness in those men's hearts from which proceeded their evil deed. Charge then the evil where it belongs. Locate it finally in the lust of this world and the pride of life. Don't locate it upon the will of Almighty God, or the constitution of things, or in the law and order of society; but put it where it belongs — in the selfish and wicked hearts of men. These social lies are all of their father the devil. Ah! but the dreamers say, make your social laws and customs right, and all these things shall disappear, and there will be no sin of man against his brother man. Yes; when I can make a bucket of muddy water pure simply by pouring it into another bucket, and not filtering it drop by drop.

We have just glanced at what human selfishness will do in the Exchange. Let us be fair. Let us look all around. Go into a shop where men are at work, — can you remove any exaction or deception which one man may practice upon another simply by making the workshop pleasanter? Can you keep that sub-contractor from petty, galling injustice simply by increasing his share of the business? I just supposed the Shylocks of the grain market consulting together for their pound of flesh. But let me change a little the scene. There are a number of men in working-dress met together. They have a perfect right to do so. That iron-clad contract which some of the coal companies have introduced, under which workmen signed away their right to join labor-unions, has been denounced by an employer of labor as the beginning of a species of white slavery. The state may yet have a duty to perform in declaring null and void any form of contract in which the freedom of a man is made a part of the price. Labor organizations have rights, and they may yet have large and healthful uses. But suppose that company of men, whatever may be their provocation or temptation, determine to shut others out from free competition. Suppose that on their part they attempt a corner in labor. What is the difference in principle? I do not say what is the difference in the offense, for I am not made a judge and divider between men. But what is the difference in principle between this corner and that, between all combinations in any class, high or low, by which a few seek to monopolize anything on this earth for their private gain? Up and down through society, everywhere, in the office and in the shop, in the lordly mansion and in the cheapest hut, among us all, warring against our souls,

and making men slaves, I see as the first fount and principle of social wrong the selfishness, the greed, the cruel lusts of this world.

Next Sunday I shall hope to conclude my subject by discussing some ways and means of diminishing social evils and wrongs. While believing as a Christian disciple in an open and fair heaven above for all who will, I shall in concluding abide by the understanding which I had in the beginning, and—in the name still of the Son of man, who went about doing good—I shall inquire further what may be done to improve the condition of men upon this humming earth, and to make present society better, fairer, and happier.

I close now with this final analysis, that beneath all economic ills there lies in humanity some moral wrong. The ultimate trouble is not that civilization has a money bag, and that some one carries it; the difficulty was and is the presence of Judas Iscariot upon this earth. How to get rid of the spirit of Judas Iscariot is the final question of modern civilization. The ultimate problem of human society upon this earth is not, Shall there be a money-bag, and who shall carry it? but, How shall we banish from among us the spirit of the betrayer of all manhood and all good?

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## COÖPERATIVE CREATION.

### II.

IN a former article it was argued that the method of God's working throughout nature is coöperative; that He manifests himself as the sustainer and rewarder, but not as the sole worker; that creation, as a natural process, brings prominently before us two classes of factors,—first, *agents* with undeveloped powers, second, *stimuli*; that many of these stimuli are of the nature of opposing forces; that response to these develops life; and that progress, the increment of evolution, is the indirect outcome or reward of the conflict that sustains life. It was further argued that the recognition of this universal method discloses to us the use of great classes of arrangements in the world, which have, in the past, been regarded as purely hostile forces; and therefore, that a far wider and more consistent basis for a statement of the argu-

ment for design in nature is afforded by evolution than by the old theory of sudden creation.

Having advanced to this point, I shall endeavor in the present article to show further that evolution, as contrasted with the traditional theory, gives us a far stronger and more rational ground for the conception of God as *benevolent*.

It might be said by one who granted the force of the argument thus far that the question as to the *character* of God is untouched by the recognition of a unity of method working toward an ever-increasing complexity. So long as the method itself is seen to involve a vast amount of suffering and failure on the part of the sentient agents through whom it is worked out, there is no proof of benevolence. The slowness of the process, the extent and intensity of the sufferings endured for apparently little gains, the frequently recurring set-backs by which these little gains are again and again obliterated, the disappointments and illusions of life, and the short duration of its satisfactions when reached, — these and other considerations may be dwelt upon till the unity of purpose, the concentration of responsibility, seems only to give more definite form to the conception of a creator who simply amuses himself by bringing into existence creatures that must struggle and fight and crowd incessantly upon each other; a creator of unbounded skill, who has so tempered failure with success, and disappointment with hope, that his creatures never give over the futile struggle to reach a happiness which ever eludes them.

The increasing complexity of life, which we call progress, is, in this view, only the novelty of situation and the intensifying of tragedy demanded by the being who thus amuses himself. Every newly-acquired capacity for happiness is offset by a deeper possibility of wretchedness. As civilization advances, wants increase more rapidly than the means of gratifying them; and the inventions which seemed to promise alleviation of suffering and increase of liberty are anon turned into the means of subjection and slavery. The highest product of evolution, the moral sense, is above all else man's torment and misfortune. Your doctrine of unity of origin and concentration of responsibility robs us of the one only consistent theory of a benevolent God — that, namely, which regards Him as the Author of all that makes for happiness and well-being, and sees in all else the activity of a hostile power against whom the benevolent Creator is forever making war. If all the forces of the universe are controlled by one Being, why did He not put his creatures in immediate possession of that happi-



ness and virtue which they cannot help imagining and striving after? What advantage does the pain and conflict bring to them? And how can the results of evolution as we know them be made to justify such a long drawn out history of cruelty, immorality, and wretchedness?

Before venturing a reply to these questions I would first ask the attention of the reader to a clear recognition of what is aimed at in the argument. If I were attempting to show that the light which evolution throws upon the method of creation made everything so clear that there could no longer be an opportunity for doubt, and no more need of faith, I should certainly be engaged in a very foolish undertaking. For this would be to assume that an important factor in moral evolution disappears on the recognition of the principle by which it works. I should be claiming for this hint from nature what has so often been claimed for the written revelation, namely, that it signalizes the reversal of God's plan of education. What I really hold is this — that revelation is a continuous process, adjusted to the developing reason of man; and that, as the problem of life becomes more complex and more difficult of solution, we may reasonably expect a continual increase of light — an increase which will be sufficient to prevent discouragement, but not enough to satisfy and make us give over seeking for more. That such new light, so coördinated with the intellectual and moral needs of men, does find its way into the world from time to time is one of the strongest evidences for the existence of a living God who watches over the destinies of men and educates them.

Evolution, then, helps us to recognize a benevolent design in this world, first, by throwing discredit upon all those utopian dreams which assume that a world without antagonisms would be better. By certifying to us the *universality* of the law that *a process of overcoming is the condition of progressive well-being*, it at the same time declares all optimistic schemes from which such a process is left out to be the absolute contradiction of known possibilities. This, if I am not mistaken, follows as a legitimate inference from the argument already developed. Without dwelling upon it, therefore, I shall endeavor to show further that evolution contributes positively to our faith in a benevolent God by clearly pointing to ultimate fruits that are of infinite worth, and that could not conceivably have been wrought out except through just such a process as that which it declares to be universal.

What, then, are these ultimate fruits to which evolution points as its justification?



To answer this, let us scrutinize somewhat more particularly the relations which exist between those great classes of results which have been referred to as *direct* and *indirect*. The distinction between these is more clearly marked in the lower animals than in man, because they have not developed the power of reflecting upon their own activities, and have not learned to make indirect results the end of effort. All along the path of evolution we see the creature striving to attain certain more or less clearly discerned advantages to which its instinct or intelligence guides it. The securing of food, the reproduction of its kind, and the defense of itself and its young against destructive influences give rise to a great variety of external activities in all of which the immediate end to be attained is the only one contemplated. A want is felt, an effort is made to meet it, and the want having been satisfied that is the end of the matter, so far as the intention and consciousness of the animal is concerned. But to a being of higher powers, to a reflecting man, this is not the end of the matter. Each effort to satisfy a want modifies the developing creature that makes it. The organs that have been used for the capturing of prey have become stronger, and particular adjustments of muscular to nervous action have been made more perfect. By a succession of efforts of this kind in response to environment the mature, powerful, experienced animal has developed its faculties. The connection between cause and effect in this process is just as much hidden from the human mind that has noticed the constant association of the phenomena of activity and growth as it is from the mind of the animal that has never conceived of it. But it does not follow that this is the end of our knowledge. For a farther study of nature has brought to our notice another class of facts, which calls for an extension of this principle or law of association. Organisms are seen to modify themselves in response to environment, not only without any direct intention of so doing, but also without any association which we can discover with the class of activities above mentioned. But, holding on to the principle which we have discovered, we make the hypothesis that these modifications are the indirect results of other activities of the organism which are not so open to our observation. There is, as we very well know, one great field of organic activity, most wonderful in the complexity and regularity as well as in the variability of its movements. All those processes which we call vegetative, such as nutrition, respiration, the circulation of the blood, and germ formation, take place, as we are accustomed to say, of

*themselves*. But we cannot stop to reflect upon the matter without recognizing the fact that they must all be the outcome of efforts made by the organism,—efforts to which the attention is not called, and of which there is no consciousness.

When, therefore, we have to account for structural or functional modifications of the organism so marked that they lead to a new variety or species, is it not rational to apply the principle which we have already discovered by supposing these modifications to be the indirect results of the *unconscious* efforts of the organism in response to environment? We know that the vegetative processes do accommodate themselves to circumstances. We know further that, as the indirect correlated results of this accommodation, important structural and functional changes are produced. As, for instance, the stomach of a flesh feeding bird like a gull will accommodate itself to a grain diet, and, as a collateral result, the inner coat of the stomach, gradually hardening itself, at length forms a gizzard. Conversely, the gizzard of a pigeon has been made to transform itself into a carnivorous stomach by a long-continued meat diet. It is not, therefore, altogether a step in the dark when we attribute much greater changes appearing in the *offspring* of plants and animals to an unconscious effort in connection with that part of the organism which subserves the purposes of reproduction. That such changes do appear in the progeny of animals exposed to a new environment is simply a matter of fact.

Let us now ascend the scale of consciousness and see if the law of association which gives us modifications and structural changes as the outcome of activities directed to other ends still holds. We have only to call to mind our systems of education to be convinced that it does. In these both direct and indirect results are aimed at, sometimes in connection with each other, sometimes not. In many cases the indirect results are labored for through activities that subserve no other end. The gymnasium is, perhaps, the best example of this, because the physical exertion expended in it has no direct useful outcome. The weights and pulleys that elsewhere are used for the production of direct results external to the laborer have here no such purpose. There is a great outflow of energy and a wear and tear of apparatus solely for the creation of what are, in one aspect, incidental results. So, also, the mechanical exercises given to one who is learning to play on the piano are not designed to give pleasure to the listener, but to produce certain utterly mysterious modifications and adjustments in the neuro-muscular system of the performer.

The same principle is largely acted upon in mental culture. Many of the hard tasks given to the boy seem to him utterly useless. Nor, if we are wise, do we try to make it out that direct results of great importance are to be expected from them. Discipline is said to be their use, and this is the word employed to express just that principle in education which we are considering, the expenditure of energy for the bringing about of valuable indirect results. It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations of this principle. The point to which I would call attention is sufficiently clear, namely, that a process which is unconscious in the lower animals has become conscious in man.

This certainly brings into view one of the strongest lines of demarcation between human nature and brute nature. The brute increases the volume of its being and becomes modified, yet knows nothing of the results or of the process. Man does the same, but knows *something* of the results, and also *something* of the process. But while this contrast is fitted to impress us with the width of the gap which separates the human from the brute mind, a little reflection will convince us that it brings into view another fact that is of even greater interest. We cannot dwell upon the thought of man's *knowledge* of the indirect subjective effects of his actions without soon having our attention diverted from this to the contemplation of his *ignorance*; and this ignorance is of great significance because it is one of the most convincing proofs that man's evolution, as a rational being, is only in its dawning stages.

The rudimentary nature of that faculty which we call self-consciousness is most strikingly illustrated by the persistent blundering of human beings in their pursuit of happiness; a blundering which has its cause in an utter misconception of the nature of it, and of the relation in which it stands to effort. One form of this misconception presents happiness to the imagination as a permanent state which may be produced by the possession of every external object of desire. Or, in another aspect, it is the state which supervenes when, all wants having been gratified, there remains nothing to long for or strive after. It is this conception that lies at the basis of the Hindoo philosophy, and expresses itself in the doctrines of *mâyâ* (illusion) and *nirvana* (the cessation of personal consciousness). The experience of life uniformly teaches that no object of desire, when attained, affords the content which it promised while it was yet an object of pursuit. The wise man, therefore, recognizing the deceitful nature of all the direct results of human striving, and seeing, also, that continued effort for satis-

faction only gives birth to a never-ending series of wants, comes to the conclusion that a cessation of wants is the one thing to be coveted.

Solomon, or the writer who personates him in the Book of Ecclesiastes, goes over much the same ground. He is possessed of everything that a human being can be possessed of, intellectual power, cultivated tastes, unbounded wealth, and the absolute command of his fellow-men. With such an equipment he gives himself to the task of discovering the secret of happiness. He turns his energies in every conceivable direction, only to find that the disappointment encountered in one pursuit is much like that encountered in another. In every case, when the quest has been carried as far as he is able to carry it, and he pauses to contemplate the direct results of his efforts, his soul sickens within him. As completed products they are utterly devoid of interest, and instead of giving happiness they weary and annoy him.

The truth of the picture as an illustration of human misconception and folly is most clearly marked in the circumstance of *repetition*. The same experiment is tried over and over again with the same results, and yet without any approach to a discovery of the principle underlying the uniformity. When the pursuit of wisdom is seen to yield only an increase of sorrow he gives his life to mirth and wine, without any question as to the soundness of the principle on which he is working; when this, in turn, is seen to be only vexation of spirit he enters with the same ardent expectation upon a variety of other pursuits. He gives his whole mind to the construction of great works and beautiful houses till his inventive powers are exhausted; he devotes himself to horticulture and arboriculture; he makes collections of all kinds; and, finally, he cultivates music. But when all is finished he can only say of the accumulated results that they are "vanity and vexation of spirit." He bemoans himself bitterly because of this repeated disappointment. His conclusion is that *all* is vanity, or, in modern phrase, that this is the worst possible world, and that life is not worth living. "Therefore I hated life."

Let us clearly observe that all this disappointment and the dismal conclusion are the outcome of a concentration of attention upon the external direct results of human activity, coupled with utter blindness as to the indirect results. Pursuing happiness as a direct end, as a thing that can be captured, caged, and possessed, he grasps nothing but emptiness; and this so fills his thoughts that he can find no consolation in the remembrance of that happi-

ness which, during the whole course of varied activities, has flowed through his soul as it were from the side. He acknowledges that his heart rejoiced in all his labor. But it is a sore grievance to him that it has always ceased with the labor, that he cannot find a way to generate it except as the indirect result of effort and the overcoming of difficulties ; in short, that he cannot produce an environment which will pour happiness into him as a passive recipient.

Now, it seems to me not too much to say that we have here disclosed the spring of all theoretical pessimism, and also of all theoretical optimism so far as it rests its hopes upon the expectation of a modified earthly environment. The optimism which postulates a perfected social condition, in which conflicts are at an end and happiness abounds, is the counterpart of that fatuity which possessed the imagination of the royal pleasure-seeker while conscious of progress toward a desired end ; and, on the other hand, the philosophical pessimism of the world is perfectly illustrated by the feeling of blank disappointment that accompanied the contemplation of actual results. For a confirmation of this we have only to study our own age and observe that the same external conditions have given rise to the most extravagantly sanguine expectations and prophecies, and, in close connection, to an outbreak of pessimistic despair such as our civilization has never before known. Nor is it difficult to see that the underlying cause of both has been the absorption of men's minds with the contemplation of the direct products of human activity. The wonderful progress that has been made toward liberty, the marvelous additions to the means of physical well-being, and the general amelioration of the condition of those who labor and are heavy laden, has given rise on the one hand to ardent expectations and prophecies of an earthly paradise speedily to be realized ; and, on the other, to the most bitter and despairing views of all that is and that is to be. The eyes of men have been so dazzled by the sight of the wealth and opportunities enjoyed by the few that the idea of happiness becomes completely identified with the possession of these outward advantages, and no possibility of well-being apart from them is recognized.

Not otherwise does the mind of the reasoner work who finds in the conflicts and difficulties of this world an argument against the benevolence of its author. The whole criticism is based upon the assumption that a greater amount of happiness would be produced if the necessity for overcoming difficulties were eliminated from



the present system. He says in effect: "If the world were the work of a benevolent God provision would have been made for the immediate or easy gratification of every want of his creatures."

How, then, does evolution help us to meet this argument? It does so, first, by turning our attention away from the direct external results of our activities, and by riveting them upon those which, though more obscure, are of infinitely greater value. It presents us with the idea of a great world-process, the clearly recognized end of which is the production of successively higher grades of being. This simple but comprehensive conception, if it proves to be well grounded, is a gain of inestimable value to human thought. Not that it is of *itself* sufficient to revolutionize the world, or to render the question — "What is life capable of making of me and of my neighbor?" the all-absorbing thought. Its great value is this: By pointing out the nature of the world-process, its unity, and the goal toward which it moves, it conducts us, first, to a clearer recognition of the relations which happiness and the progressive realization of a higher self sustain to each other; and, second, it indicates how these two are related to human volitions. To begin with, it leads us to inquire whether continuous happiness, which cannot be generated by direct external acquisitions, may not have some vital connection with the indirect increment of evolution which progressively constitutes us higher beings.

This inquiry is not barren of results; for a true analysis of our happiness will convince us that it depends upon our consciousness of what we *are* rather than upon the possession of anything that is not ourselves. What is the greatest loss that it is possible for a human being to sustain? Is it not the loss of self-respect combined with the absence of any hope of regaining it? When the Apostle Paul says "the law slew me," it is just this loss that is indicated. The "Oh wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me?" is a cry of despair wrung from one who is suddenly revealed to himself as an utter and hopeless failure. If this seems to any one to be the contradiction of the blessing pronounced upon those who humble themselves, it is only necessary to remember that this condition is blessed only in view of a method by which the lost self may be laid hold of and put in the way of a true realization. It is surely a well-recognized truth that the first step in the recovery of the consciously fallen is to give them hope. Hope of what? It may be that it takes the form of restoration to the respect of society. But this is only because the respect of society is the out-



ward proof to a man that he has worth in himself. And the exceedingly high value that we place on the esteem of our fellow-men is that this reinforces an estimate of self which we have more or less difficulty in keeping up, but which is the very soul and foundation of our happiness.

But in finding the *source* of happiness we have not disclosed the secret of its continuous generation. The fact that we are so dependent on the recognition of others reveals the unsatisfactory nature of the self on which our happiness rests; and reflection will show us that happiness does not continue to flow from any *fully realized* state of being any more than it does from the possession of external accumulations. We must, therefore, add to our idea of conscious worth the idea of progress, and say that the condition of continuous happiness is the sense of a progressive self. The desire of all desires, the constant element in all healthful human life, is the yearning to *become*. What, then, shall we say of the pleasures of idleness? I think it is safe to say that they are non-existent. Absolute idleness is absolute wretchedness. What we call idleness is simply a relative thing. It is a condition in which activities are largely unconscious. Rest may, indeed, be happiness. But rest is recuperation. It is a condition of activity and effort on the part of the vegetative processes, and in healthful organisms the sense of enjoyment gives place to uneasiness and a craving for activity as soon as the waste has been repaired.

Happiness, then, is the concomitant of progress. It is the singing of the soul, the rejoicing of the creature in prosperity of being and the consciousness that the ends of existence are being realized. It is nature's indorsement of effort, the constant attendant of its evolutionary process. More than this even, it is to some extent the guide and director of it. It is, indeed, true that men actually develop along widely divergent lines, and find happiness in so doing. But we have to remember that our truest evolution depends upon the development of many faculties, and that much of this development takes place consecutively. The energy of our life current streams now in one direction, now in another, and in each happiness attends it so long as the activity is normal and not excessive. It is possible for us to have a considerable degree of it even while realizing the ends of being in a very partial and one-sided way. But this imperfect way cannot be long pursued without the production of a counterbalancing unhappiness. One of two things takes place. Either the one-sided development narrows

into an all-absorbing devouring passion like avarice or greed of power, or it runs itself out into the dreariness and emptiness of *ennui*. There is no true development in either case, but, on the one hand, a morbid cancer-like growth, that eats up the very springs of life and joy, and, on the other, the failing of desire and the cessation of all movement.

Evolution and happiness alike depend on the constant springing of new wants. Except the satisfaction of one want plants at the same time the germ of a new one there is an end of progress in any given direction. *Wants*, therefore, the most mysterious outcome of evolution, are at the same time its motive power. The whole progress of creatures from lower to higher grades of being is effected by means of them. They are the rungs of the ladder by which we mount. Whence they come we know not. Why when one want is satisfied another higher up on the scale should take its place we cannot begin to conceive. Rational creatures though we be, these unforeseen increments of evolution never cease to surprise us. Every time a new want makes its appearance we awake to the fact that we are *new creatures*. It seemed, as we looked forward, as if the requirements of life would be met by the satisfaction of wants of which we were then conscious. But now, while the old creature is satisfied, the new one has all the restlessness and importunity of youth. This is the pledge to us of the possibility of further evolution and of attendant happiness. The true line of progressive being, therefore, is clearly indicated to be that in which there will be no cessation of wants that may be progressively realized. If such a continuous development is possible, and if we can discover its direction, we have good reason to believe that we have a definite knowledge of the main drift of human evolution.

But this is not our only line of approach. While experience points to the conclusion that moral satisfactions are the only ones that have the inexhaustible generative power which we are seeking, we have for the indorsement of this result the testimony of the moral sense, the supreme guiding faculty in all rational beings. The first line of argument points out to us where to look for a development which will insure a continuance of wants and happiness; while from the latter source we have certain knowledge, through a conviction which we cannot analyze, that the quality of moral wants and happiness has an infinite superiority in-kind to that of any generated by movement in other directions. The name of the highest want on this scale is love, a want that has

endless manifestations and inexhaustible possibilities. The highest grade of being which we can conceive is that in which this supreme want of the soul has, while centred upon the most worthy ideal, its most complex and perfect development. To him who develops in this line there is the promise of perpetual youth, of eternal life.

But at this point I shall probably be reminded that, in my effort to find justifying fruits of evolution, I have wandered far away from the basis of actual scientific fact, and have gathered from dreamland the pleasing but unsubstantial products of a hopeful fancy. Where, I shall be asked, do you find a foundation for the assumptions that the evolution of the future is to be sought for in the line of the spirit, and that there is a continuance of the life of the individual after the dissolution of the body? As regards the first position little need be said, because so much has been said by eminent scientific authorities<sup>1</sup> to the effect that the farther development of man in the physical line is not to be anticipated. There is, it is true, no lack of physical variation in man when we take into account the development of the brain and the nervous system, but a distinguishing characteristic of the race is its lack of power to transmit these variations, except in the form of general tendencies. As regards the assumption that the evolution of the individual is continued after the death of the body there can, in the nature of things, be no absolute scientific proof. Science only tells us of that which *is*. But from that which *is* we may draw inferences, and in what follows I will try to show that the analogies of evolution and the facts of human consciousness support each other, bearing concurrent testimony to the belief that where rational beings are concerned the main line of evolution is in the individual, and that it does not terminate with the physical organization, but leads on to some higher synthesis which our imaginations cannot compass.

What does nature teach us as to continuity of life? It seems to say "there is no such thing as the continuity of the individual beyond a short span of existence, during which a regular course is run,—a course of development, of decline, of decay, of extinction." Passing on to species we find a much extended continuity. At the beginning of organized life evolution postulates one or a few original forms, which give rise to other distinct forms, each one of which has a greater or less degree of continuance. Every time a new species is evolved we have a new type, which may be

<sup>1</sup> See *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection*, by Alfred R. Wallace.

perpetuated so long as it can hold its own in the struggle for existence, and beyond this there may still be a modified continuity in other species to which it may have given rise. The continuity of the species is not affected by the destruction of the individual organism, because each link in the chain has the power of transmitting, with slight modifications, all its characteristics. In the animals below man almost everything that belongs to the individual belongs to the type. Even acquired intelligence becomes organic in them as it does not in man. Wild birds that have learned to fear man bequeath this fear to their offspring as an instinct, and the increment of evolution is made permanent.

This is indeed not so manifest in the case of domesticated animals. They vary much more than in a wild state, and do not bequeath their variations to so great an extent. But they are not true examples of animal life. They are dependent and to some extent artificial creations, adjuncts of man; and though from their close association with him they develop some almost human traits they are in important respects degenerate. But it is only when we consider man himself that we find a condition of things which is actually the reverse of that which prevails among the animal tribes. In him we find the greatest capacity for differentiation combined with an absence of the power of transmission, or rather with the reduction of this power to its lowest degree.

All the ability of this kind which man possesses bears the stamp of a faculty that is in its decadence. It is the survival of a power which we find fully developed only among the lower animals. His physical qualities he does indeed transmit as the animals do. But his mind, which is the distinctive thing about him, he cannot reproduce. Every sound individual of the human species has within him the germs of a distinct personality. Every developed man discloses to us a personality that is a thing so absolutely by itself as to warrant us in classing it as a separate and independent type. And this separateness of the person, as an entity to which nothing else corresponds, consists not simply in the extreme differentiation of mental qualities which man possesses in common with the brute. It depends mainly upon a quality which man alone possesses, that quality in virtue of which he is self-conscious and moral.

Removing from the individual everything that is adventitious we come upon the real man in the *moral* personality. This moral personality is not a stationary thing. It is a consciously moving existence; and the most prominent thing in its consciousness is

the conviction of unrealized possibilities into which it is developing, or may develop. Subtract from personality its sense of immaturity, blot out its

"Blank misgivings of a creature  
Moving about in worlds not realized,"

and you blot out the thing itself. It is *mâyâ*, the illusion of all illusions. It is not indeed true that every personality is moving in the line of development and increase. It is equally possible for it to move in that of degeneration. But so long as it does advance toward a further realization of its being, it is contrary to the analogy of nature to suppose that it is to be extinguished.

But, as we have seen, personality cannot be continued through transmission to another physical organization. Temperament may be bequeathed, but not character. In the continuity of animal life there is no loss of moral personality, simply because no such thing has been evolved. But if we suppose that a man perishes when his body dies we take the ground that evolution having given birth to its most highly-differentiated forms comes to an abrupt ending just when it holds out the greatest promise of an infinitely worthy result. If, on the contrary, we believe that a man lives when his body is dead, the fact that this new type is not continued through a succession of physical organizations is not a reason for believing in its non-continuance. It is only a reason for believing that evolution has worked itself free from material perishable vehicles, and that the continuity of the soul is henceforth independent of these.

There remains, however, another hypothesis to be considered, another kind of continuity which is held by many to be the full and satisfactory compensation for all the loss which men would suffer in the extinction of personality. The results, direct and indirect, of a lifetime of labor and experience, though they cannot be handed on by physical generation, may, it is said, be continued in the race through the power which mind has of impressing itself on mind. Parents may educate their children, who have inherited something of their tendencies, into the acquirements and the experiences which they cannot transmit directly. The philosopher, the scholar, and the scientist has each the power of bequeathing his gains to other minds that may again hand them on, in modified forms, as a perpetual race legacy. The same may be said of character. Character has a tendency to reproduce itself wherever it comes in contact with moral agents. Characters of superlative worth, it is alleged, remain through their influence in the race,



and find their completion in the evolution of the social organism of which they have become a part. Thus it is the privilege of every human soul to perpetuate itself in the body and substance of the race. Though the individual perish, the influence, the power, the knowledge, the character lives on, and tends to produce a more and more perfect type of humanity; and every individual born into a given society inherits, to a greater or less extent, its accumulations.

This conception, which has received and is receiving much favor in our day, has had its rise and development outside the limits of distinctively Christian thought; and the optimistic dreams which it offers have been presented, for the most part, as the antithesis of the promises of a personal immortality held out by Christ and his apostles. But Christian thinking has not been unaffected by it. Urged upon us by philosophers of high standing as the only logical outcome of human evolution, it has been accepted in a modified form by some eminent Christian writers. And the danger from this source to the highest and most ennobling of our convictions could not be easily exaggerated if it were true that a scientific evolution shuts us up to the conclusions of Comte and Herbert Spencer. Once let us conceive that evolution secures its highest results in the line of "corporate immortality," of a perfected social organism to be realized on earth, and the idea of personal immortality becomes, as a side issue, hopelessly dim.

But I cannot fear that such a result is to follow the acceptance of evolution, for the simple reason that the assumption on which it is founded appears to be as clearly unscientific as it is unscriptural. Its supposed scientific basis is a confusion of the evolution of a *person* with the evolution of the *environment* of a person. Personal character is an incommunicable thing. It is just as impossible for it to reproduce itself by budding as by sexual generation. One character cannot give birth to another. It can do no more than produce a favorable *environment* for like character. Moral life in one person helps to produce moral life in another; but not by direct germinal transmission. God and the individual are the joint efficient cause of moral personality. The soul having been born is developed by conscious antagonisms, and fed by conscious appropriations. It lays hold of ideas and grows by assimilating them; but while it assimilates it transforms. No one takes from another, who may be his parent, teacher, or ideal, more than certain elements; and the self, which is elaborated as the indirect and, for the most part, unconscious increment of voluntary activi-

ties, has continuity neither in other individuals nor in the body of the race. The Saviour of the world did not save men by the direct communication of his own character to them. He declared the impossibility of receiving any good from Him except there were first the awakening of a life of the same nature as his own, through the operation of the Spirit of God in response to the determination of the individual will. In other words, Christ, the perfect man, acted upon the souls of men simply as environment.

There is, then, an evolution of the environment and there is an evolution of the person, and these two are distinct things. The failure to grasp this distinction has been the occasion of great scandal to evolution. For aside from the difficulty of showing that there has been, or is likely to be, any general and persistent movement toward the realization of such a social ideal as that which an earthly optimism postulates, the dream itself is a distressing one to any mind that takes a broad view of the condition, past, present, and to come, of the great mass of struggling human beings. The goal toward which such an evolution moves is one to be enjoyed only by the few favored generations that may be born when the process culminates. During untold thousands of years human beings have been toiling, fighting, suffering, for what? Not for anything that they can participate in, but for the *earthly* happiness of some few far-off generations that shall exist when evolution has reached its climax and before it has advanced far on the decline that awaits all material things.

It is only when we change our point of view, and look for the highest fruits of evolution in the line of moral personality, that we can breathe once more the free air of faith and hope, — a faith that extends to every generation of rational moral beings, and that lights up the whole path of history. For this conception brings human history before us as that of a great training school, — a school that in different ages has been under different controlling impulses, and has taught its pupils now one thing and now another, but which has always been preëminently a school of discipline and a school of beginnings. Its diploma, *WELL DONE, GOOD AND FAITHFUL*, is not conditioned upon the possession of great acquirements in any department of knowledge, nor upon the development of mind in specific directions. It is given to him alone who has developed moral life and power according to his environment. It is not conditioned upon complexity of moral life. He who has been faithful in few things, if only a few have been committed to him, is one of the *fit* who shall survive. There is

not *one* solitary type of moral perfection, there are many types and many beginnings toward the realization of them. Every age of the world, and every condition of society, not wholly degenerate, has afforded opportunities for the development of some of these types.

There have been nations and civilizations that in the mass have moved on the downward line. And it is most instructive, as throwing light on the hopes of corporate immortality and the perfection of a social organism, to remember that some of the most hopeless examples of degeneration are afforded by nations into which the most heroic and elevated lives and ideals are said to have been incorporated. As we look down the records of this great world-school of discipline the fact as to environment seems to be this: There have been at different times and among different peoples accumulations of resources, the results of moral striving. But it cannot, by any means, be affirmed that the most effective work has been done when these accumulations have been largest. Each one who has graduated worthily from this school has carried with him the most precious thing he has elaborated in it. The spirit in which he has lived, so long as it is remembered and comprehended, is a valuable legacy to the world; but all else, his knowledge, his philosophy, his contribution to the material well-being of men, is of doubtful value.

Intellectual and even spiritual legacies may dwarf the society on which they fall. However admirable in themselves, they can be of real benefit only as they stimulate to new conquest and the evolution of new character. In so far as they cause the recipients to rest in that which they have received they are a curse. And herein we may see the blessing that lies in the perishable nature of all human accumulations, and the benevolence of that destruction that at times sweeps whole civilizations into oblivion. For out of such destruction the human soul that had grown old and decrepit may germinate afresh and begin to grow. Ignorance is not the worst of evils. Self-satisfaction is a far greater one. Ignorance is a deficiency of the soul, and when it becomes conscious may be the spring of progress. Self-satisfaction, on the contrary, is a disease that yields to nothing but the most heroic treatment.

I will not deny that the conception which underlies the theory of corporate immortality is a very noble one. The possibility that those who come after us may be the wiser, the stronger, the happier because of influences which we have contributed, is a thought to stir the most elevated passions and nurse lofty moral heroisms.

To faithfully labor for such a result is truly to love one's neighbor as one's self. But why is this end so noble? Why does it inspire us? Not surely because we believe that the course of human life on earth will be made somewhat smoother for those who are to come after us. Not because our struggles and conflicts will have left them less to fight for. And yet, if we make a thorough-going application of the theory which holds out the improvement of mundane conditions as the ultimate end of human evolution, we shall be obliged to confess that this is all that is left us. Before we call this conception ennobling, therefore, let us be sure that we have eliminated from it all the convictions that have grown up in our minds through the belief in the actual continuity of the person. If we think the matter through we cannot escape the conclusion that it is this belief, and this alone, that lends dignity and sanctity to human life. It is because those others whom our activities are to affect have interests of transcendent importance to realize that the thought of living for them is noble and inspiring. It is this that makes conflicts welcome and trials sweet.

All optimistic schemes of a highly-developed moral future which do not look beyond our present conditions of existence have within them a self-destructive principle. For the consummation which they postulate is not reached through the evolution of new elements in response to a higher environment, but by the subtraction of antagonisms; that is, by the elimination of elements that are essential to progress, and therefore to happiness. When the highest point of such an evolution has been attained, the source of the greatest happiness, *the confident belief in a something better to be realized*, has been forever closed up. When the greatest freedom from dissatisfaction has been reached, and conflict is almost at an end, the end of joy also is close at hand. The gradual cessation of heroisms and struggles has reduced not only the intensity of life, but the volume of life itself. Except we find some analogy for this earthly paradise, it is, as Mr. Herbert Spencer would say, "unthinkable." But the only analogy that can be found in all nature is that of painless degeneration. It is, in fact, the body of that death from which to save us God sent his Son into the world.

And this brings clearly before us the consideration which is the main point of my argument, namely, that the *one* infinitely worthy product of evolution, moral character, could not have been brought into existence by a method radically different from that which has been made known to us. A state of perfectly adjusted

adaptations, into which neither pain nor conflict enter, logically requires, it is true, no process of overcoming, no travail of the creature for its realization. Such a world might have been, so far as we can see, created by a sovereign mandate. But from the idea of a world so created we must subtract every moral quality. And this is just what the philosophers who find the goal of evolution in life as conditioned on the earth, more or less consciously do. Mr. Herbert Spencer manipulates the word *right* until it comes to mean nothing more than *agreeable*; and then distinctly tells us that "among the best examples of absolutely right actions to be named are those arising where the nature and the requirements have been moulded to one another before social evolution began."<sup>1</sup> His illustration of this is the relation that exists between a healthy mother and a healthy infant, while imparting and receiving food.

The goal of social evolution is therefore a return to its starting point; there has been no gain except in complexity. The type of the most highly-evolved man is most clearly outlined in those exceptional persons who, having inherited perfect health, have led decorous lives because they have been carefully screened from everything involving conflict and temptation. These are to-day the most advanced fruits of human evolution. But if this is a correct rendering of the great world-process we cannot avoid the conclusion that the fully-developed man will be far less blessed, less noble, less happy than many of those who fought his battles for him.

But I shall be reminded that the highest outcome of evolution has been said to be love. When, therefore, a soul has been evolved till it is fully possessed by the highest love will there not be an end of conflict and also of moral evolution?

I answer, Love is a want. Where love is, there also is desire. Second: The highest love is a moral want, and it can be kept in existence only by the continuance of that moral energy that has given birth to it. Love to God would not have the moral character that it has if it could have come into the human soul without conflict. The greatest power which rational man has is the power of training his wants. "Thou *shalt* love the Lord thy God." And here we touch the very spring and root of responsible self-creation. Our love grows in the direction of our efforts. In its germinal stages love to God is the response of the soul to a naturally, *divinely*, implanted ideal. When this response becomes active, in voluntary effort, the indirect increment of such effort is

<sup>1</sup> *Data of Ethics*, p. 261.



a *higher* idea of God and of self as related to Him. If we may conceive the evolution of a soul as a succession of stages, this process is repeated at every stage. The ideal expands, strivings are renewed, love deepens, the moral personality moves on to a fuller realization of itself.

There is no conceivable end to such a process ; for effort and overcoming need never cease. We may not indeed have to strive forever against a lower self, but there is no conceivable limit to external fields of activity. Even with our present environment progress is most rapid and most real not when conflict is directed immediately against self, but when we are engaged in helping others to fight the good fight. And as we have been permitted to be workers together with God on this present stage of action, we may reverently believe that, through all changes of environment, we shall continue to be co-laborers with Him who in all nature manifests himself as overcoming. "*Thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things.*"

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### WHAT MAY JUSTLY BE DEMANDED OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THE Public School System is one of the features of the nineteenth century. First planted in New England, it has here borne its ripest fruit. Sustained by the doctrine of Burke, that "Education is the cheap defense of nations," it has gradually vanquished its enemies. The abolition of the rate bill, the enforcement of a compulsory law, and the overthrow of the idea that a free school is in any sense a charity school have all been duly accomplished ; and the burden of illiteracy thrust upon us by immigration has been kept within reasonable bounds.

Said C. F. Adams, of England, who made a critical study of our schools some years since, "Either the American system has produced a satisfactory result, or else a conspiracy on a grand scale has been entered into by travelers from all nations, including such observers as De Tocqueville and Fraser, to deceive the world as to the measure of intelligence and information in the United States." A system of education, now so universal and so firmly established, must be conducted upon principles more profound than those which control its mere organization. It must have an historical basis as

well as an organic life. The so-called new education of to-day, which is infusing itself into our public system, claims to be the renaissance of all that was good in past systems. A glance at the theories which are becoming so popular will convince us that there is much in them that is neither accidental nor novel.

We are indebted to the ancient Greeks as much for what they achieved in education as for what they bequeathed to our language and literature. The close relationship of physical stamina to character, and the necessity of perfecting as far as possible the individual man, as conceived by the Greek mind, is one of the corner stones of educational science. Their ideas of manhood developed to physical and intellectual perfection were idealized in the gods of Mount Olympus, and those ideals found expression through the plastic arts for the instruction of all mankind. This system of education, so exacting and exclusive, was followed by that of the Romans, which was its counterpart in point of practical every-day value. The Greeks sought a harmonious culture that would make men godlike; the Romans aimed at a severely practical training which would make men of the world, as orators, warriors, and statesmen. I speak particularly of these two systems, as they suggest that conflict between the ideal and the practical which has stamped all educational history since the time of Christ. The claims of both sides have been heard. To develop the individual, and at the same time to fit him to be useful, has been, and must be the aim of every thoughtful educator.

With so great a contribution to modern education from the pagan world we can hardly expect to find in the Christian system of the Middle Ages anything more valuable. The dominant type of education was that of the monastery, and it was far more ecclesiastical than practical. The castle and the town provided some instruction, but the humanistic teaching of the schoolmen became the staple. It was the germ of modern classical training. Passing on to the theories of the realists, of whom Comenius was a leader, we find them to be in sharp contrast to what had gone before. The best teaching of to-day obeys many of their rules. To follow the order of nature, to teach one thing at a time, to avoid compulsion, to learn little "by heart," to study things and processes first and then the rule,—these and other principles come to us as a legacy from the sixteenth century. We find much to learn, also, from such writers as Ascham, Milton, and Locke. They, with others who followed them, endeavored to found educational doctrine on psychology. They recognized the important fact that

to train the intellect alone was to dwarf the man ; that the physical and moral powers must not be left untrained. I can only allude to three other theorists of more recent times, whose teachings embody the best ideas of the old systems and form a connecting link between them and those of the present time.

The first of these, Rousseau, not a teacher, but a thinker, saw in education the means of developing more broadly and strongly the powers of the child. He pleaded for the greatest possible freedom, and would have the youth become a perfect animal before being subjected to severe mental training. "Individual human worth" was to his mind the highest end.

Pestalozzi and Froebel, both teachers, men of large insight and sympathy, inspired by the startling theories of Rousseau, did much to place the art of teaching upon a sound practical basis. The study of things rather than of abstract ideas, the training of the eye and hand in a great variety of industrial and artistic occupations, to allow nothing to enter the school life which represses the natural interest and enthusiasm of the child or impairs his physical and moral powers, to make the end of education the generation of power rather than the acquisition of knowledge, — these are some of the aims of the reformers which are exerting the most powerful influence upon primary teaching to-day.

I have, perhaps, said enough to establish the fact that education has a creed based upon experience and tradition. Although less mature as a science than medicine, law, or theology, it promises much for the future. That those engaged in public education are the most zealous students of educational science to-day cannot be gainsaid. Admitting this, we may proceed to consider the conditions under which public schools exist and the difficulties they have to meet.

The graded school was organized as an economical device for educating large numbers of children together. The rapid growth of cities and towns, with the large accession of foreigners to our population, has compelled a too hasty extension of the system. In most cities the supply of buildings has been far behind the number of children to be educated. The pressure for room has often led to the erection of buildings which, in their sanitary appointments, were wholly unfit for the purpose. The schools being unable to resist the pressure for admission, instead of providing for thirty or forty pupils in a room, which should be the limit, are compelled in many cities to accommodate from fifty to seventy, to the detriment of life, liberty, and happiness.

During all this period of phenomenal growth in population we have heard, on the one hand, the demand for universal and thorough education, and, on the other, the protests of the tax-payers against their increasing tax-bills; and how can taxes fail to increase when the ratio of non-tax-paying citizens with their swarms of children is constantly increasing? The standard for school architecture and all appointments pertaining to convenience and sanitation has been steadily raised during the past twenty-five years, but it is not strange that in the older cities buildings erected from twenty to fifty years ago fall far short of meeting the requirements which health officers and critics of the school system are now making. The number of cubic feet of space per child is too small. There are no suitable means of exchanging foul air for pure air. To say nothing of the injury wrought under such conditions, it is poor economy, for the working power of both teachers and pupils is greatly reduced. The brains of children who are poorly fed and wretchedly clad get too little nourishment without being flushed by blood which is literally poisoned by bad air. The fevered face and the heavy eye tell in too many school-rooms that the air is being breathed over and over again. There can be no rebound of spirits or responsiveness to either precept or example under such circumstances. If the body is sick; the mind and heart are sick also. Instead of ambition and energy we see a morbid dread of exertion. It is intermittent, to be sure, lasting only while the hours of school last; when the boy is in the open air he is himself again, and feels the glow of life in his every part. The school system will be sorely handicapped until the public purse is large enough to remedy this evil.

Other crudities, as, for example, over-organization, and too rigid discipline, may be regarded as incidental to the youth of the system. The stage of reaction and criticism through which the schools are at present passing will do much to insure relief at these points. Another source of trial to the teacher is the heterogeneous mass of children which flocks into the school. Compulsory education in a land which has become the world's asylum and poorhouse presents some striking features. It is true, the public schools are generally recognized as the best, and our school rooms are brightened by the faces of children from the most refined homes. But every country in Europe is represented there, and several nationalities of Asia and Africa. Some of these children have behind them several generations of ignorance, drunkenness, and crime. The same tendencies which make loafers,

strikers, and dynamiters of the parents are branded upon the constitution of the children by merciless hereditary law. Nor is this all. They live at home in the presence of brutality and of hatred to God and man. Even before the age arrives when they can be admitted to the school, they have been already educated in the home and upon the street, and that other law, which is twin brother to heredity—the law of habit—no less potent for evil than for good, has so taken possession of the child as to defy both the art and the patience of the teacher.

Nor is this the only barrier in the way of those who would make moral training the first aim. We must observe also the tendency to secularize the school and make religious teaching either of secondary account or a forbidden thing. The various arts practiced to allure children to cheap places of amusement reeking with immorality, books and papers which literally teach vulgarity and lawlessness, skillful tricks employed to entice the young from their homes to the skating-rink, the pool-room, and the saloon,—all these must be considered as forces in active hostility to the best aims in public education. Add to these things the indifference of many parents, and the unreasonableness of some, and a fair estimate may be made of the trials which beset the teacher.

But opposed to all this there is another side, brighter and more encouraging. Educational literature of a high order is being freely circulated, so that the valuable theories to which I have already alluded are becoming current knowledge. Not only have some of the best German works been translated for the use of English and American teachers, but since the adoption in England of a thorough system of inspection, and the establishment of colleges of training and chairs of pedagogy, several works have been produced on the art and science of teaching which are destined to invest the subject with a new interest and lift it to a higher plane. The works of Herbert Spencer, R. H. Quick, William B. Carpenter, Edward Thring, Alexander Bain, Joseph Payne, J. G. Fitch, and Oscar Browning, most of which are comparatively recent, are being read widely in this country, and are doing much to elevate the standard of teaching. American books on education are not so sound or helpful, but the fifty or more periodicals published either weekly or monthly are of no little value. Then I will mention the Normal Schools, of which every State in the Union has one or more, by means of which the schools are provided with the most important of all things, *trained teachers*. The average grade



of ability of principals and supervisors, to whom is usually intrusted the direction of school work, compares favorably with that in other professions. In this, as in other fields, the standard of talent is determined by the temper of communities expressed in the amount of appreciation and compensation rendered for service given.

The fact that the public schools, instead of being patronized as formerly mainly by the poor, have at length come to include the children of the most intelligent and cultivated gives them an increasing opportunity for usefulness, and entails additional responsibility upon their management. For the democratic spirit which leads the majority of parents to look to them as furnishing the best training for citizenship in a republic operates to secure a generous provision for their support.

It is universally true that any public institution will give back to a community a benefit commensurate with the support and the sympathy which it receives from that community. Now, as communities differ very much in their ideas of what education is worth, and how much of it the masses should receive at public expense, so there are the greatest possible differentials in the benefits conferred. To avoid misunderstanding, and to keep the discussion within sufficiently narrow limits, I shall now speak of the obligations resting upon schools where the support is ample and hearty, and where teachers and supervisors are allowed reasonable freedom in their work.

The first and most just demand upon the school is that it lay the foundations of character, quicken the moral sense, and help the child to become an honorable citizen. That "the brain is not all of the man" should be remembered and acted upon by every teacher.

In answer to the question, How can morals be taught? I would say that the personal character and example of the teacher are of first consequence. He must have insight with somewhat of the missionary spirit. Character begets character, and nothing else will do it. The force of habit, which is fundamental in all action, whether mental, moral, or physical, must be thoughtfully recognized. Things rightly done and repeatedly done lead to the automatic doing, and help to lay the foundations of good conduct. This is the only true method of training the will, and is a most economic element in child culture. The cardinal lessons of punctuality, promptness, cleanliness, silence, industry, self-control, attention, and application are what a good school should make habitual in

every individual child. It is fair to demand that the teacher seek these desirable ends, not for the sake of a perfect system, but for the sake of a perfect character. Thus there may be rhythm and harmony without weariness and drudgery. Right motives must be encouraged. Ambition, energy, and hope, if they are to be potent in after life, must be zealously fostered in school. The way in which a few teachers crush out these most promising tokens of future strength deserves constant and vigorous protest.

The marking system, a relic and reminder of ancient methods, is gradually yielding to better incentives to study. What a pupil is forced to do, or is hired to do, adds little to his self-reliant character. To build up and strengthen the forces *within the child* is the highest art in moral training.

Abstract and itinerant gossip about right and wrong in the school-room creates a distaste for morality. Moral lessons clothed in concrete form may be given in such a way as to interest and impress the child. For this purpose studies of character as illustrated in the lives of eminent statesmen, warriors, and authors are most useful. Such lessons, while opening the richest stores of historical knowledge, quicken the moral instincts of the pupil, kindle his patriotism, and fire him with noble ambition. The lives of such men as Washington, Franklin, Lafayette, Lincoln, and Garfield afford limitless opportunity to impress lessons of honor, fidelity, and heroism. The study of noble sentiments, significant events, and the results of human experience embalmed in masterpieces of literature is another means of shaping character. To memorize selections which embody noble Christian sentiment is to plant good seed in the mind and heart. In all such studies the higher strata of thought are awakened, purity of expression and literary taste are cultivated. What is done with manifest pleasure and profit in so many schools should, by popular demand, be made a universal practice. But there should be no exclusiveness in moral training. The whole school life should be moral in tone and tendency. Reverence to God and respect for man, frankness and truthfulness, accuracy of speech and courtesy of manner, should be diligently sought by the teacher. The necessity of the times demands that children be fortified against the prevailing national vices. The evil effects of tobacco and the horrors of drunkenness should be heralded loudly and frequently without fear or favor. I have my doubts whether it is feasible to teach in the lower grades the physiological effects of alcohol and tobacco, or whether much is to be gained by so doing. Their ruinous effects

upon life and character are realistic and startling. It is fear rather than knowledge that is needed, as was the case with those who partook of the forbidden fruit.

Schools, by common consent, are usually opened by acts of devotion and worship. Demand that this worship be rendered in spirit and in truth, and not become a mockery and a sham through the conventional indifference of everybody who ought to guard the religious life of his children!

In thus making moral training the first thing to be justly demanded of the schools, I am regarding character not only as the most important end, but also as a basis for that higher religious teaching which it is the office of the church to give. Unless these foundations are laid in the family or in the school, what is the church of the future to do? Most of the preaching heard in our churches seems to assume that such foundations are laid somewhere; and comparing the amount of time spent in the day-school with that spent in the Sunday-school we can easily decide where the most influence is exerted. Let the Christian world, then, while enforcing its demand for a sound moral training, lend its active aid and sympathy to the efforts of the schools in this direction.

The second just demand is, that our schools train for life,—that the acquisition of power be placed before the gaining of knowledge.

The clamor for something in the schools more useful and helpful is heard all over the land. Most of the so-called "attacks upon the school system" have voiced more or less distinctly the desire for more efficiency in those sent out from the schools. Very many hold the opinion that public education, in order to make the best citizens, must be partly industrial. And the claim is made with some reason, as I believe, that were the time of pupils somewhat evenly divided between manual occupation and mental labor there would be a more full and harmonious development of the powers. But those who make these demands have two serious problems to solve before they can ask educators to enter upon so radical a change. The first is the question of expense, which must be settled with the tax-payers and boards of education; the second is the conflict with labor which would arise were manual training in the schools carried to the extent of teaching trades. It cannot be doubted, however, that the clamor for a more industrial training is based upon a true principle, which will eventually assert itself. And, even at the present time, I must acknowledge

that schoolmasters are too slow in discerning the signs of the times. Those who are impelled to no higher service than to fill the mind with knowledge, or to keep it chained to the pages of a text-book, are not abreast of the age. But, with our present arrangements, to train children to observe, to think, and to express thought clearly, to lead them into the art of silent, rapid reading, may justly be required. Then it may be asked with reason that the school work be closely connected with the every-day life of the world. The business of the store, the office, and the bank will furnish enough arithmetic. The history and politics of the present time should not be neglected. The newspaper, with its stock quotations, weather reports, market prices, shipping lists, doings of the State Assembly and Congress, with news of what the world is doing, as well as all current literature, are proper subject matter for conversation in the school. To neglect all these, as some persist in doing, takes the school out of the realm of the real and practical and reduces it to a dreary routine.

There is still another step which educational critics are not always intelligent enough to include in their demands, and which, it gives me pleasure to say, some of the New Haven schools have already taken. That is, the introduction of some inexpensive industrial work in every grade as a relief from purely mental toil, and as a training for the eye and the hand.

For pupils between the ages of five and nine the occupations of the kindergarten are being successfully adopted, with manifest benefit. Drawing, building, cutting, pasting, pricking, weaving, folding, moulding, and sewing are some of the features of this business. Between the ages of nine and twelve I would demand for girls plain sewing, and for the boys, in place of something better, practice in collecting and arranging specimens of minerals and plants. For the remaining two years of the grammar-school course, while the girls are allowed to give a little time to original designing and embroidery, I would have the boys take a course in mechanical drawing, and give one or two afternoons each week to work with carpenter's tools, as one hundred boys in New Haven are doing in the shops of the Dwight and Skinner schools. The expense of all this is comparatively little. It tends to enforce the dignity and necessity of labor, and will make better men and women.

Having placed character first in importance and efficiency second, I need only to allude to the third demand, which is that the school furnish the child with a good store of information. But intelligent critics will always recognize the truth that it is not the

amount that is learned, but the manner in which it is acquired, that is most important. A modicum of well-digested information is better than a mind that is crammed.

The common school can only open the lower windows of the soul to the great avenues of knowledge and start the child on the road to self-education. Those who are fortunate and gifted enough to reap the benefits of the high school may properly be expected to have a thorough elementary education, and perhaps a little more than that. The idea that any high school can turn out boys and girls at the age of eighteen thoroughly educated, or too much educated, is a fallacy. They have a good knowledge of mathematics, but not enough to enable them to survey a field or construct a road. They have taken the first steps in science, but must have further training and long experience before they can be experts. So, also, in history, politics, and general literature, the test of excellence must be that a few things have been done well. If there is anything in the school system that fosters conceit or unfits a boy or girl to enter upon honest labor it should be pointed out and speedily eradicated.

I can only refer briefly to the obligation resting upon the schools to guard with vigilance the health of every pupil. The public does not yet feel the responsibility it is under to make every school-house a place of comfort for both child and teacher.

The most pointed criticisms in articles recently published seem to imply that teachers are in some way to blame for bad ventilation, overcrowding, long hours, etc. They are so only as they fail to make a judicious use of all the means that are furnished them. The public at large, and school officials particularly, must take such criticism to themselves, and, instead of getting angry, must be thankful that the crust of indifference is occasionally broken, and that some one is trying to educate public sentiment to a higher standard. The thing above all others to be desired is that intelligent and well-disposed tax-payers inform themselves as to the conditions under which teachers of some public schools are obliged to work, and see what difficulties are encountered. If possible, let criticism be directed against a specific class of abuses for which particular persons are responsible. It is not fair to assume that the evils existing in a particular school, or in the schools of any town, are universal. No preacher or doctor wants to be held responsible for the sins of his neighbor, — no more does the teacher. Let every one bear his own burden.

I shall not attempt to reconcile the demand sometimes made for



greater economy in school expenditure. One would suppose from occasional writings on this subject that the money raised by the school tax and paid to teachers is lost to circulation; and that the property of the school district is just so much reduced. If we are to demand so much of the school system is it not right that its cost should be greater than any other public expenditure? The army of intelligent men and women employed to take the place of parents in controlling, training, and instructing the children of the land are not misers. The money they earn flows directly back to their patrons through the legitimate channels of trade.

I have attempted to show that the educational creed now accepted is the outcome of what was best in old theories, and that the public schools are adopting this creed; that the growth of cities has been so rapid, and the attendant difficulties of developing the school system so great, that with all that a generous public has yet done, and with all that earnest teachers could do, little more than a foundation has been laid for the public school of the future.

I have shown that results should be demanded in the following order: first, in character, second, in efficient power, and third, in knowledge; and that health conditions should receive the mutual consideration of all interested. Any failure of the schools to meet all just demands should receive intelligent, specific, and discriminating censure.

Concerning that bitter and unwarranted charge, in which sensational writers sometimes indulge, to the effect that the public schools are responsible for the prevalence of crime, I will quote a remark of Julia Ward Howe. She says: "If it is right for society to ask of teachers, 'How have you educated the children?' it is also right for the teacher to ask the parents, 'How have you bred them?'" Or I will point to that more profound principle enunciated in the question addressed by the Rabbi to the great Teacher, "Did this man sin, or his parents, that he should be born blind?"

*S. T. Dutton.*

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

## EDITORIAL.

## PROGRESSIVE ORTHODOXY.

## I. CRITERIA OF THEOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

THE announcement of this "Review" affirmed that it "will advocate the principles and represent the method and spirit of Progressive Orthodoxy." The word "orthodoxy" was employed as a concise and convenient expression of our conviction that theological progress does not involve or require any break with the faith of the church catholic, any recasting of the primitive ecumenical creeds, any departure from the fundamental principles of the Reformation. We have no special regard for the epithet "orthodox." It has been sufficiently abused to give ground for offense. It suggests to some minds narrowness, arrogance, and intolerance. We much prefer to be recognized as disciples of Him who is the Truth than to be credited with conformity to standards of belief of human construction. But we are not insensible to the reality and worth of character in the sphere of thought. Human progress would be impossible if everything in belief were changeable. No man could hope for moral perfection if in the power of choice itself there were not the possibility of a permanent preference, or if liberty were not exercised in a system of things which makes for stability. The word orthodox designates theological character, recognizes constant as well as variable elements in religious belief, discriminates the position and work of those who are entitled to appropriate it from the revolutionary aim of men who deny the historical basis of Christianity, or resolve it into what are called the eternal truths of the spirit, or substitute for the divine Spirit the human reason, and are unable to save themselves from the method and consequences of rationalism. The present is rooted in the past. Christianity has a permanent basis in historical facts, in a faith once for all delivered to the saints, in a Canon of sacred Scripture. There is a collective and continuous Christian consciousness. Our recognition of this relation of the new to the old is expressed in our motto, "Progressive Orthodoxy."

Happily on this side it is not now necessary to say anything further. Even ecclesiastically what is called, not very exactly, New Theology, or better, the new thought in theology, has won for itself a recognized place and a fair field.

On the other side there is still abundant occasion for discussion. Many problems are not yet ripe for even a provisional and relative solution. In respect to these there is need of research in many directions, and of the publication of results. This "Review" will continue to welcome contributions of this character. They prepare the way for future positive gains in theology, both theoretic and applied.

We think, also, that the time has come for an attempt to point out certain theological improvements which we regard as already assured. The phrase New Theology has not yet come to signify a definite, compact body of opinions, like that denoted by Augustinianism, Federalism, New Lights, Hopkinsianism, New England Theology, New School Theology, or by yet other appellations which have successively arisen as the way marks and descriptive titles of Progressive Orthodoxy. It is applied largely and loosely to a great variety of opinions advocated quite independently by numerous writers in many countries. In its widest inclusion it embraces tendencies which are more or less contradictory to apostolic Christianity and to the general tradition and faith of the church. In its more correct and reasonable use it covers many movements of thought which are quite distinct, one from the other, and are not likely immediately to coalesce or harmonize. Even where there is greater affinity of conception there is diversity in the field which is cultivated. One class of writers busies itself chiefly with the dogmatic problems necessitated by the growth of the evolutionary philosophy. Another is occupied with questions of historical criticism. Another is absorbed in the development of the new science of Biblical Theology. Another seeks from a yet more interior and central position to state the leading doctrines of our religion in the light and under the inspiration of the revelation of God which is given in Christ. Perhaps the stamp which marks most distinctly and comprehensively this new Divinity is reality; and the phrase "Real Theology" is in this and other respects a better designation than "New Theology." It is real because it deals with beings more than with abstractions, with actual processes and their rational contents more than with *a priori* assumptions, with laws of life and organic forces more than with mechanical combinations, with wholes or parts in their relations to wholes, with things more than with words, and with persons more than with things. Wherever an investigator in the wide domain of knowledge is seeking for and touching reality he is contributing to this theology. There is a strong bond of sympathy between all such workers, even though the limitation of their labor and the narrowness of human vision may hold them apart.

But, at present, as we have said, this general unity of spirit and aim on the part of those who are commonly recognized as advocates of the New Theology exists along with a noticeable variety of special opinions and judgments. Not all of these can be harmonized. Not all have vindicated their character as purely Christian. Some are professedly advanced as provisional, hypothetical, tentative. There exists, in consequence, a degree of uncertainty in the public mind as to what may be covered by the phrase New Theology, — an uncertainty which is only heightened by a method of polemics to which we shall refer more particularly farther on.

In this state of the case we cannot but think that some service may be

rendered by an endeavor to point out certain particulars in which we believe that it can be definitely shown that the New Theology is an advance upon the old. Leaving general phrases, which may easily be made to hold either too much or too little, we would turn attention to certain fundamental doctrines, and show in what respects there is improvement in their apprehension and use. The task is not an easy one. But no important work is, and it seems to us to be timely and to promise good. There has been a great change in the public mind, especially that to which we are most immediately related, even since our first issue. The number of persons who desire information as to what the New Theology can offer is increased. Prejudices have been overcome. Not a few friends of progress, if we are not mistaken, who once were distrustful of this theology have already discovered that it has in it something desirable and helpful for them; and that even if some of its positions and inferences are insecure, yet, taken as a whole, it is a real and salutary advance in Christian thought. Such persons will welcome our endeavor, and will deal kindly with its imperfections. We cannot but hope that others, at present more critical in their attitude, possibly pronounced in their opposition, may see reason for a less unfavorable judgment, may even discover that the new movement really signifies a better apprehension of the truth and a larger use of the power of the Gospel which they and we alike have received in faith and as a sacred trust. We shall, accordingly, in successive issues of this "Review" present a series of editorial papers discussing theological topics in respect to which we claim a definite advance. Our purpose will be to set forth, within this limit, the new thought in theology, as we understand and accept it, and to indicate in what respects it is differentiated from the old.

As preliminary we submit now a few remarks upon certain criteria of theological progress more or less in use. Some of these seem to us misleading or precarious; one we accept and would commend as true and serviceable. Our aim is simply to suggest a few practical considerations elicited by various comments upon the New Theology which have fallen under our eye, not to offer a systematic discussion of this subject.

I. We notice, first, certain tests which appear to us to be imperfect and misleading.

1. One such criterion is found in the oft-repeated charge of vagueness. The imperfection of this test lies in its lack of clearness. It may signify that no distinct thought is conveyed by a writer's language. If this is a correct judgment it goes without saying that no advanced thought is offered, for no thought at all is presented. Or it may mean that no definition is attempted of the subject discussed, that its bounds are left indeterminate, that its horizon is not described by a sharply cut line, that its treatment turns attention to personal qualities rather than to abstract propositions and calls for spiritual insight rather than mere dialectical acuteness. Such vagueness, as already intimated, may imply an advance.

Such a method may be, both in method and result, a gain through the abandonment of excess of statement and through the endeavor to make the language used correspond precisely to the kind and degree of knowledge afforded by divine revelation. Experience shows that it is all important for theology, in the discussion of the more incomprehensible truths of religion, to know where to locate a mystery. Put for instance the problem of the Trinity into the definite mathematical question how three can be one and one three, and the solution is made impossible at the start. It is equally important for criticism to learn where vagueness may rightly cast its shadow and where indefiniteness is a theological virtue, where it is a twilight from the morning and not a settling down of night.

2. Nor is entire novelty of doctrine a sign or test of progress. One of the most common methods nowadays of trying to disparage the New Theology is to deny that it offers anything new. If it brings into prominence the Incarnation the comment is: "So the church has always believed." If it attempts to set forth the divine character in accordance with the inspired declaration "God is love," the comment is swift: "So we have always known." If it seeks to change the centre of theology from a doctrine of the covenants, or of decrees, or of divine sovereignty, to the ethical nature of God as revealed in Christ, it is discovered (or doubtless soon will be) that the various systems which have been formed about these distinct principles are all Christocentric — something as his latest biographer has found that Dr. Emmons made the divine loveliness a formative principle of his theology!

This test of novelty is vague and precarious. Its ordinary use shows a lack of exact thought; an arbitrary application of an uncertain rule. There may be novelty without progress, and progress without entire novelty.

We use the term now as we find it in vogue. We do not deny nor doubt that in a real and true sense all progress implies something new. It will be our endeavor to point out certain *differentiæ* of the new theology from the old. But our immediate point is, that this advance cannot be discredited by showing that it is in part a revival of an older theology, in part a development and application of principles previously elaborated and used, or that it opens to theology no absolutely new doctrine, to creeds no additional article of faith, to practical piety no other way of salvation than that revealed in the beginning. Progress in theology is a progress in method and then a progress in result. It may be intensive when not extensive, qualitative when not quantitative. It is at times a matter of accent and emphasis more than of additional information and improved statement, of interpretation rather than of new data, of combination and proportion as well as of increased knowledge, of new order and not simply of new materials. There is no doctrine of the Bible, however rudimentary and essential, which is not susceptible of illumination and higher systemization in the progress of a scientific faith; and there may be



an endless advance in the larger inclusion and better correlation of known spiritual facts and truths, for these are intrinsically not simple units or measurable quantities or tangible things, but revelations of the highest and grandest personal qualities and actions, and of the vastest relations and destinies. Obviously, therefore, the question of progress is not settled by showing that the New Theology revives old truths or affirms accepted doctrines. The inquiry still remains: How does it employ them? Does it give to the love of God any more central and dominant influence, any juster and wider application than previous theologies? Does it more amply interpret the fact of the Incarnation and assign it a more Biblical and real relation to human history and to Redemption?

We are ready, however, not only to concede but to claim that the progress of theology is more than formal and intensive. We dispute the canon which limits it to what can be derived directly from the letter of Scripture, irrespective of the interpretations of Providence. The church of to-day has a fuller knowledge of the purpose of God respecting the extension of Christianity, a better conception of the dispensation of the Spirit, and of the relation of Christianity to human history than it was possible to communicate to the early church. The fulfillments of prophecy yield an ampler knowledge than could be derived immediately from the original record. Events are God's messengers; providences are his interpreters; the Christian centuries are the promised times of the Spirit and unfold divine purposes. Something new is revealed in the growth of the Christian church, as indeed in all development.

But even from this highest point of view the new material is not an absolute creation. It is given germinantly or typically, or is pledged in purpose and promise, in the original revelation which is its supreme law. So that it is evident that the test of novelty needs to be applied with much reservation on this side of an alleged advance as well as upon the other. And ordinarily, so far as we have observed, those who have applied it to the New Theology have used it quite thoughtlessly and superficially, and without any attempt at proper discriminations.

3. A third erroneous test of dogmatic progress may be characterized by the word isolation. A particular tenet is separated from its connection with the system of which it forms a part, and then is judged by principles derived from a different theology. Men trained by a dogmatics which knows no higher antithesis than law and grace find it difficult to understand and impossible to accept views of doctrine which rest on the prior and original relationship of paternity and sonship, simply because they never penetrate in their thinking to this basis. It is equally useless to expect those whose conceptions of the divine government are determined by the dogma of a limited atonement to appreciate conclusions which imply a universal atonement. So men who fail to start with a thoroughly ethical conception of the Divine Being are apprehensive of evil consequences from positions in eschatology which are misunderstood

because divorced from their premises and robbed of their inspiration. A new movement should be tested in its fundamental principles, not by particular inferential tenets, taken out of their true setting and relations.

4. A fourth erroneous test is gained by a device of combination. This is so near to dishonest trickery that we will not dwell upon it. It associates a variety of opinions, picked up over a wide range of authorship, and charges upon each progressive thinker the sentiments and conclusions of every other. The result is labeled New Theology, and the whole is judged by its weakest part.

But enough of imperfect and false tests. Can a true one be formulated?

II. For ourselves we accept as such a criterion — the best and most comprehensive test known to us — the principle recognized in the opening article of this "Review": "Theology is the science of God. God is revealed in Christ. The possibility, the unity, the verification, of a science of divinity are given in Him and in Him alone."<sup>1</sup> Progress is made just in proportion as doctrines are Christianized. The ultimate test of advance is Christological. The point always to be determined with reference to any alleged improvement is whether it promotes the knowledge of the central principle of Christianity in itself or in its operations.

We suppose that it is a sense of the truth of this criterion which underlies the frequent representation made by the opponents of the New Theology that their own systems are Christocentric. It is implied that if they were not so, the claim of this theology to be a real advance would in principle be justified. We gladly recognize the full measure of truth in such claims. The tendency of Christian thought has for long been in the direction of such a method of theological construction. One of the most marked characteristics of modern theology, as compared with either the mediæval or ancient, is the development given to the doctrine of the Atonement. This movement culminated in the New England Theology. The doctrine of divine sovereignty had still a formal ascendancy, but this sovereignty was thought of as sovereign grace, and as administered on the basis of a universal atonement. This is an important approach to a Christocentric system. The work of Christ is exalted to a position of dignity and power never before so adequately and scientifically represented. Yet this system with all its excellences is still far from being Christocentric. Its doctrine of God and of his purposes was not thoroughly Christianized, but contained unassimilated deistic and pagan elements. Its theory of the Atonement subordinated the Person of Christ to his work. Its anthropology was too individualistic, and was not ruled by the thought of divine sonship. Justification was treated mainly on its negative side and was not connected with Christ's resurrection. Its eschatology, with many special merits, is a receptacle of all the imperfections and misconceptions which have crept into previous parts of the system. The

<sup>1</sup> *Andover Review*, vol. i., p. 2.

whole of it, as Dr. Henry B. Smith says, must be Christologized. A truly Christocentric system will be won when, and not until, the Person of Christ rather than his work is made central in Redemption, and is seen at the same time to be central also in Creation, Revelation, and the universal kingdom of God. For such a theology is not a mere pietistic eulogy of the historic Christ, nor even a profound apprehension of some one or more of his offices or acts alone, but a systemization of religious doctrine through the knowledge of God, and especially the knowledge of God's ethical nature, communicated by Him who is the beginning and end of all divine revelations. And when once this fundamental conception of the nature and method of theology is really gained it will be discerned with equal clearness and necessity that the true and ultimate test of all theological progress is its Christianization of its materials, from whatsoever source they may be derived.

#### THE REVISION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, AND THE RELIGIOUS PUBLIC.

It is expected that the Revised Version of the Old Testament will be given to the public during the month of May. It is not too much to say that its appearance takes rank among events of the first importance in the religious world. It marks the completion of an enterprise which was wisely planned, and has been nobly executed. It puts in our hands the finished result of a work which was begun fifteen years ago, and in which the most eminent English and American scholars of the various denominations have been harmoniously engaged. The entire Bible, including both the revision of the New Testament which was completed in 1881, and the version of the Old Testament which is now completed, is at length offered to the public. Regarded in breadth of plan, or in the importance of the end, or in thoroughness of scholarship, or in the fraternal spirit of the English and American companies, it is indeed a *magnum opus*.

As we write before the revision is actually in hand, we are not able to consider details of translation. In our next number, if the revision shall have appeared, we intend to print an article from the pen of one of the revisers, in which there will be indicated some of the more important and interesting changes, as well as the principles which have been followed in the entire work of revision. But now that we are on the very point of receiving the version, and expectation is eager, we are carried back to the state of feeling which immediately preceded the appearance of the revision of the New Testament only four years ago. It is scarcely possible to imagine a greater contrast. It is very instructive for various reasons to recognize the change which has come about in so short a time. There are now scarcely any traces of the apprehension which was then generally felt. Even those who were perfectly aware of the defects and mistakes of the King James' version were extremely doubtful concerning the wis-

dom of giving the Bible to people in any other dress than that with which they had always been familiar. To-day it would be difficult to find a person of average intelligence who has the slightest solicitude in view of the version which is now expected.

The writer was present at a largely attended meeting held in a New England city in 1881, a few weeks before the New Testament revision appeared, and when several of the revisers were upon the platform to address the audience. Dr. Schaff, the chairman, Dr. Chambers, Dr. Kendrick, Professor Thayer, and Dr. Ezra Abbot were among the speakers. They were evidently aware that the prevailing state of mind throughout the congregation was a state of disquietude. Almost every speaker addressed himself to the task of removing apprehension. It was conceded by one that reluctance to receive and circulate the Bible in a changed dress indicated high regard for Revelation, and that only for urgent reasons should the old give way to the new. It was maintained by another that none of the essential truths of the gospel would be modified by the revision. It was emphasized by a third that new renderings restored the beauty and significance of passages which had been obscured, and that the doctrine of Christ our Saviour would shine forth the more clearly. It was affirmed and reaffirmed that not a new translation, but only a careful revision of the existing translation, had been attempted. The only exception was Dr. Abbot, who read a paper on the variety of Greek manuscripts from which the present text had grown, so clear in expression and so admirable in grouping that the audience listened to it almost with fascination. That congregation, which was of more than ordinary intelligence, fairly represented the attitude of Christian people towards even a revision of the King James' version of the Bible. Many felt that it was equivalent to breaking down the authority of the Bible even to alter the phraseology. It was eagerly asked if the revision would change doctrinal views. For such reasons the most intense interest was aroused. The people of Chicago had their first sight of the revision in a newspaper, to which the entire New Testament was telegraphed from New York. For a few months afterwards it was considered an act of some boldness to introduce it in the pulpit. When Yale College and Andover Seminary placed it in their chapels, announcement of their courage was spread abroad, and even then it was supposed that it was in courtesy to the revisers who were on the faculties of those institutions. But it is found in many pulpits now, and if it is not generally used the only reason is that the literary form is not satisfactory.

There is no such feeling in respect to the version which is now appearing. It is true that the Old Testament is not considered, in popular estimation, so important doctrinally as the New. But if the revisers had issued the Old Testament first there would have been the same opposition and solicitude. Fears, in the other case, were found to be groundless, and it is therefore felt that there is no occasion to be alarmed now.

Popular interest is chiefly concerning the literary quality of the revision. The serious objection to the New Testament revision is against its style. It has made its way slowly because many have felt that stateliness of diction and the exquisite flavor of quaintness have been sacrificed to insignificant points of accuracy; that English idiom has been needlessly supplanted by Greek constructions. Any other objection has become powerless as compared with this. The first, the most searching, and the final scrutiny of the Old Testament revision will be directed to the style and diction. How do the devotional passages fare in the new rendering? Can the beauty and reverential tone of the psalms be improved or even preserved in other words? Will the poetry be as poetical? Will it not lose in spirituality and in rhythmical quality if the phrasing is changed? Will the prophecies retain that suggestive, imaginative wording which makes them mystical and not didactic, and which pictures kings and prophets peering out into the hidden future? In another phraseology will the devotional portions be as available and as satisfactory as they now are? But these are not questions of alarm or even of solicitude. The comparison along these lines will be made with a quiet mind. For purposes of instruction the new revision will, we are sure, be of incalculable value, and if in literary, spiritual, devotional quality it is inadequate we shall reassure ourselves with the reflection that we are not to be deprived of that which has so long been in our possession.

The obvious fact is that the revision which appeared in 1881 has been an education to the religious public. People have learned that the truth does not depend on any particular expression of it; that it can stream through the window of nineteenth century speech as clearly as through the window of seventeenth century speech; that the treasure is not lost by pouring it from one earthen vessel into another, but that even thus the excellency of the power is seen to be of God and not of men. Since it has been learned that the difference between the original and the translation of the New Testament is less than had been supposed, it is taken for granted that there will be no startling changes in the Old Testament. Half-educated and pedantic preachers (who for most purposes are properly classed together) had said so much about the meaning in the original that hearers had begun to fear that the English Bible is not — even on important truth — trustworthy. The revision gave proof of the practical fidelity of the King James' version. The inference is that if it was faithful to the apostles it is not unfaithful to the prophets. The fear of a new rendering has so generally passed away that we can scarcely realize there was so much disturbance only four years ago. The first installment of the revision broke up slavish regard for the letter of Scripture, and restored to their place of majesty its spirit and truth. The intervening years have marked rapid progress in intelligent opinion and use of the Bible.

As matter of fact, however, it is probable that the revision of the Old



Testament will seem to include more important changes than the revision of the New Testament, or at least that most readers will gain more new knowledge. Clergymen and educated people are not as well acquainted in advance with the alterations which may be looked for. Greek scholars, even in the ministry, outnumber Hebrew scholars ten to one. Outside the ministry there were many who, either through their own study or through commentaries and religious periodicals, knew some of the important differences between the Greek and English Testaments. But there are few who have such knowledge in the Hebrew Scriptures. It is not known, therefore, for the most part, what the changes will be, nor where they may be looked for. Not many readers will turn rapidly from this to that and then to another passage which they know need to be differently translated. It may be quite generally known that the third verse of the nineteenth Psalm should omit the word "where" so as to read "There is no speech nor language; their voice is not heard," which precisely reverses its meaning, but it may be doubted if the vast majority of educated readers have in mind half a dozen passages besides to be compared. Nearly all of the information given by changed translations will be entirely new. Certain portions of the psalms and prophets will stand in quite another light. The accustomed interpretations will give place to meanings which are more real, suggestive, devout. There will be more of the peculiar flavor of Hebrew thought and expression. Verisimilitude will be restored as to the harmonies of place, circumstance, national tradition and custom. We shall look through Hebrew eyes and minds rather than through the thought of modern religious life. It is probable that some obsolete and obscure words will give way to intelligible words. But antiquated English has concealed truth. The substitution of modern for obsolete words will help us to understand more nearly the thought of the writers. It may also be expected that certain passages will become plain which in the received version yield no meaning at all. Some of these, to be sure, are unintelligible even to Hebrew scholars, for words occur in them which are not found elsewhere, and to which there is no clue whatever. Perhaps some mark will designate these verses which are hopelessly confused. But many others will be deciphered, so that not a little will be added to our knowledge of God's Word.

It is not likely that this revision will contribute much to a correct theory of Inspiration. It is true that studies in the Old Testament more than studies in the New bear upon the origin and growth of the Bible, but the result of studies with such a bearing will not appear in the revision. The most important question for criticism is concerning historical order: Was the priestly code of Leviticus given in all its minuteness in the wilderness, or not till after the exile? Was Deuteronomy from the hand of Moses, or a later compilation? The answer to these questions concerning the historical growth of the Hebrew Scriptures has an obvious bearing on theories of the method and progress of revelation. But the

successive order of the books will be in the revised as it is in the received version. The revision takes the old English version and makes it a more faithful rendering of the original, but does not attempt a rearrangement of the order. It has to do almost exclusively with textual criticism, and does not touch the higher criticism except as better renderings may contribute to it incidentally.

The German plan for revising the Bible may seem to be better than the English. A revision has been given to the people for their criticism, and it is intended that a final revision shall embody the best results of the popular judgment. It is therefore called the *Probe-Bibel*, the trial Bible. It has often been said of the New Testament revision that if popular criticisms as to style and diction could have been known, some of the most objectionable features would have been absent. It may be, however, that revisers would take less pains with a translation which is avowedly tentative. It would be decided to let many passages go in a form not strongly approved, in order to learn what might be said of them. Translators must have felt more responsibility and have exercised more care with a final than with an experimental revision. At all events, the revisers had the benefit of popular criticism on their New Testament work, and we shall soon know whether or not that criticism has aided them concerning the literary quality of their Old Testament work.

It is not easy to determine how generally the revision will come into use. As a commentary it will be indispensable to every careful reader of the Bible, for a correct translation is the best commentary possible. In the Episcopal churches it will not find a place at present. Besides, they have never used the received (or King James' version) of the psalms. It may be predicted that in other churches it will come into use more generally than the revised New Testament has succeeded in doing, for the reason that it will do much to make the Old Testament Scriptures intelligible. The growing custom, which cannot be too highly commended, of reading Scripture lessons both from the Old and New Testament in every public service, will create a demand for a revision which aids in the understanding of portions of the Bible that have hitherto been somewhat obscured.

Every translation of the Bible for popular use constitutes a religious epoch. The great advances of the church have synchronized with new translations. This revision will have a silent but mighty influence. When scholarly knowledge becomes common property, there are not only more intelligent, but also more spiritual views of revealed truth. The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. A translation which has been in use two hundred years comes to be held in superstitious as well as in affectionate regard, so that the bondage of the letter waxes strong. But truth in new expression is almost new truth. In fresh and modern garments the Word of God gains new freedom and power. Whatever contributes to clearer understanding of God's revelation is certain to

promote its spiritual power over the faith and life of men, and to quicken recognition of its divine origin.

"And even things without life giving a voice, whether pipe or harp, if they give not a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped? For if the trumpet give an uncertain voice, who shall prepare himself for war? So also ye, unless ye utter by the tongue speech easy to be understood, how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye will be speaking into the air."

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## THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

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### THE PREDESTINATION CONTROVERSY IN THE LUTHERAN CHURCH.

THE appearance, early in 1880, of a new semi-monthly entitled "*Altes und Neues*" at Madison, Wisconsin, under the editorial management of Professor F. A. Schmidt, of the Norwegian Theological Seminary, first announced to the theological world that there would be a controversy on the subject of predestination in the Lutheran Church of North America. A number of circumstances conspire to make the present a favorable time for a summary of the development of this contest in the past five years and of the *status controversiæ* at present. This is all the less a work of supererogation as the debate has been carried on chiefly in the German and the Norwegian languages, and in periodicals to which the general reader can find access only with some difficulty. The controversy will naturally have a special interest for those who are acquainted with the ins and outs of the New England controversy on a similar subject some decades back, for most of the leading questions which then brought the great theological contestants into the arena have here been discussed again, although, of course, from a different stand-point and for a different purpose.

The controversy originated within the bounds of the Synodical Conference, the youngest, but the largest, most active, and most conservative of the four general synodical bodies in the Lutheran Church of this country. It consisted entirely of German and Norwegian Synods in the West, and numbered about two fifths of all the Lutherans in the United States. The leading member of this organization was the Missouri Synod, which alone constituted about two thirds of the Conference. The other members were the Ohio, the Norwegian, the Wisconsin, and the Minnesota Synods, the last two but small bodies. The leadership in the Conference naturally fell to the Missouri Synod, and here again to that man who stood out prominently from among them as a theologian, teacher, and preacher, namely, Dr. C. F. W. Walther, of St. Louis, who is acknowledged by friend and foe to be a dogmatician without peer in the Lutheran Church of America. He is a remarkable man with a remarkable career. It is no exaggeration to say that he more than any other man has given the Lutheran Church of this country that impetus to conservatism and confessionalism which is now being felt in her every fibre throughout the length and breadth of the land. Some thirty years ago he with a few Saxon

pastors and immigrants, who would not live under the corrupt church government in their fatherland, settled near St. Louis, to set up there the sign of Lutheran confessionalism at a time when these Confessions were scarcely known by name even to the majority of Lutheran clergymen. The little leaven has leavened the whole lump, and the little Missouri organization, combined with a number of favorable circumstances, has managed to give to the Lutheran Church of America the direction of faith and life that now pervades it. It is necessary to mention these facts, as they alone explain the almost unbounded influence which Dr. Walther exercises within the bounds of his own and allied Synods, and the great veneration which other bodies of this religious communion entertain for him; which facts have been very potent in the present controversy. Dr. Walther's name has always stood synonymous for the strictest orthodoxy in the Lutheran Church. He it was who again brought back to recognition and respect the official Confessions of the church as laid down in the Book of Concord, and who made the systematic study of the great dogmaticians of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Chemnitz, Hollaz, Gerhard, and others, find favor throughout the church. When, then, just he was accused by men of his own Synod and by Professor Schmidt of the Norwegians, certainly the second scholar in the Conference, it is no more than natural that such a charge gave rise to most intense excitement in the circles directly affected, and every one was on the *qui vive* to see how matters would turn out.

The basis for the accusation was the debate of the Western District of the Missouri Synod in 1877 and 1879. The matter was brought up rather incidentally and accidentally. The topic for the regular discussion in 1877 had been the thesis that the Lutheran Church in her theological system gives all the glory to God. This brought up the point whether such was the case also in the doctrine of predestination, where the dogmaticians of the church, and the Confessions, too, as these had been generally understood, teach that election takes place, not absolutely, but *in view of faith* (*intuitu fidei*). Here, it was thought, the teachings of the church assigned a part of the glory to man. Dr. Walther had prepared the theses and led in the debate; in fact, the expositions in the Minutes of these two synodical meetings are acknowledged on all sides to be his work and views. Already in the first of these two pamphlets it had been maintained that the doctrine of an eternal election and predestination in view of faith was neither Scriptural nor in accordance with the Confessions. The true view was represented to be that God elected irrespective of any conditions on the part of man; that for some reason to us unknown he chose certain ones who were eternally to be saved, while he did not select the rest, and thus suffered them to be lost on account of their sins. The selection of the elect, however, was represented to be not merely the mere fact of selection, but it was repeatedly and emphatically added that this includes also the determination of God to call, enlighten, give faith to, and preserve in the faith until the end, those whom he had chosen for eternal life. Predestination, then, according to the views of the Missouri Lutherans, comprehends the selection of the few for salvation, but on the way which the Biblically revealed plan of salvation teaches, namely, through faith in Christ, which faith God by the very act of predestinating determines also to give to the elected persons. Predestination, then, is not in view of faith, but is *unto* faith.

In this connection several matters were further emphasized. Missouri wishes it to be distinctly understood that it teaches only a predestination unto life, not one unto death. It further maintains that of the reasons why God selects just these persons and not others no man can know anything, as these reasons have not been revealed to us. That is the great mystery in the election of God, and upon the fact of this mystery great stress is laid. Then they claim that they cannot be made responsible for any conclusions which by logical process may be deduced from their premises, as God has revealed the latter but not the former.

Immediately upon the publication of the Minutes of 1877 opposition to the views there expressed was heard, but no publicity was given to it. Private conferences were held, and it seemed not impossible that the difficulty could be amicably settled. In 1879 the Western District again discussed the problem, and again had Dr. Walther prepared the theses. When these appeared in print it was seen that, instead of modifying the views that had given so much offense, the position taken two years before was only reiterated and emphasized. Thereupon Professor F. A. Schmidt, who wields a facile pen in English, German, and Norwegian, began the publication of his "*Altes und Neues*." He with others maintained that the predestinarian views of Missouri were, if not outspoken Calvinism, yet thoroughly Calvinistic in their character, and if consistently carried out would result in Calvinism. Dr. Walther and his friends answered these charges in their periodical, the "*Lehre und Wehre*" of St. Louis. The direction thus given to the argument from the very outset was a confessional and not a Biblical one; although the latter was later also discussed in the various periodicals, and still more at a number of general and special conferences. Each party claimed to represent the traditional views of the church as laid down in the Confessions. The Book of Concord treats of this doctrine only in one place, namely, in Article Eleven of the "Formula of Concord," the latest and longest of the different Lutheran Confessions. But this article contained the shibboleth of neither party, and its wording is such that both claimed it for their views. The Missouri party maintained that the word "predestination" was here used in a narrow sense, and embraced only the selection of the persons, while the anti-Missouri party claimed that the eight points included in that article under predestination embraced the whole process of salvation, and that the word was thus used in a wider sense. On this point "*Altes und Neues*" carried out the historical argument with an exhaustive fullness seldom witnessed in theological or other debate. As the words of the Confessions seemed not to lead to a conclusion of the matter, Professor Schmidt ransacked the great tomes of the authors of the "Formula of Concord" and their contemporaries to see how, in the day and date of the Confession, this point of doctrine was understood. He showed beyond a doubt that as far as this was concerned historical evidence stood entirely and unanimously on his side. The authors and signers of the "Formula of Concord," as well as also the theologians of the church of that period, teach a predestination in *view* of faith. In fact the Missouri party now admits this fact, and only claims that either these fathers erred in their interpretation of doctrine, or that those now teaching this doctrine understand it in a different sense from that in which it was then understood.

This latter point now made a change in the line of argumentation, and transferred it to the anthropological field. Missouri claimed that its



opponents were synergistic in their teachings, as they admitted the coöperation of man in the work of salvation in him. This was especially claimed to be the case because the anti-Missourians maintained that the willful resistance of man (*muthwilliges Widerstreben*) could be overcome through his own exertion. They were very particular ever to emphasize the fact that they did not ascribe any merit to faith as such; that this faith was in no wise a work of man, but purely a gift of God; that in the matter of predestination it was not even a *causa minus principalis*, as some dogmaticians admit; but that it was the faith given by God through the means of grace, and that it is a faith which grasps the merits of Christ as its sole anchor of hope.

In connection with this line of development many other important and fundamental theological problems were discussed. Especially was it maintained by the opponents of Missouri that according to its views God would necessarily have two wills: one, open and revealed, according to which he wishes the salvation of all; another, secret and hidden, according to which he desires the deliverance of the elect alone. It was also pointed out how a predestination *unto* faith undermines the doctrine of justification by faith and the efficacy of the sacraments. The totally un-Lutheran character of the views was further shown to be indicated by the fact that Missouri's statements agreed almost *verbatim* with the utterances of Calvinistic Confessions, especially with that of the Synod of Dort, which teaches an election "*non ex prævisa fide, sed ad fidem.*" Missouri met these charges by denying that they were legitimately drawn from their doctrine, and repeats the charge of synergism and even Pelagianism against its opponents. Outside of the Synodical Conference the Missourian views are everywhere declared a new doctrine and un-Lutheran. No other Lutheran synod nor any Lutheran of prominence in this country or in Germany is friendly to these views. Most seem to agree with the late Dr. Krauth, of Philadelphia, who declared the Missourians to be "inconsistent Calvinists." There can be no doubt whatever that their views are new in the Lutheran theology and church.

With this "*inner Gang*" the outward development went hand in hand. A number of periodicals were started with the outspoken purpose of combating the Missouri views. Among these are the "Columbus Theological Magazine" and the "Columbus Zeitblaetter," which became the chief mediums for more elaborate articles in English and German, while the "Lutheran Standard" brought the matter before the English Lutheran people of the West, and the "Luthersk Vodnesbyrd" before the Norwegians. The Ohio Synod, the second in size in the Conference, already in 1881 confessed its adherence to the traditional doctrine of the Lutheran Church and withdrew from the Conference. In the Norwegian Synod the pastors, who have ever had a strong attachment for Missouri, adhere, in a considerable majority, to Dr. Walther's views, while the congregations are firm in their old faith, as they have learned it from the popular exposition of Pontoppidan, whose explanations have for a century and more been the handbook of Christian instruction in the Scandinavian churches. The Norwegian Synod has indeed withdrawn from the Conference, but has not yet attained to peace at the synodical hearthstone. The controversy in the matter seems to be undermining its very existence. The Missouri Synod soon chose to stand and fall with its able leader. Dr. Walther's influence was so mighty that he succeeded in get-

ting the whole synod of over eight hundred pastors almost unanimously to accept his expositions as the Confession of that body. Scarcely a baker's dozen dissented and severed their connection. The other two members of the Conference, the Wisconsin and the Minnesota Synods, soon yielded to Missouri's persuasion and adopted its Confession as their own. The other Lutheran bodies in this country have stood by so far as silent spectators. Only the New York Ministerium, belonging to the General Council, has secured from the Philadelphia Theological Faculty an official "Opinion" on the disputed point, and this "Opinion" is decidedly anti-Missourian. The Theological Faculty of the University at Rostock has also been appealed to, and they too have in unequivocal words condemned the doctrine of an election unto faith. The battle is not yet over, but the forces seem somewhat exhausted, and the contestants appear to have come to the conclusion that a continuation of the struggle in the former manner and spirit will be without many practical results.

*A Lutheran Observer.*

#### THE INSTITUTE OF HEBREW.

We have more than once had occasion to speak of the work of Professor William R. Harper's Hebrew Summer Schools and Correspondence School (see vol. i. p. 568 sq. : ii. 212). The success of these undertakings has made the conduct of them a burden too great for their enthusiastic and indefatigable promoter, and Professor Harper, therefore, some months ago invited the coöperation of a number of Old Testament scholars, most of them professors in theological seminaries.

Accordingly, at a meeting held in New York, December 30, 1884, the "Institute of Hebrew" was organized, with the following officers: President, Prof. George E. Day, D. D., New Haven; Vice President, Prof. C. A. Briggs, D. D., New York; Secretary, Prof. J. P. Peters, Ph. D., Phila.; Principal of Schools and Treasurer, Prof. W. R. Harper, Ph. D., Morgan Park, Ill.

The design of the Institute is thus briefly set forth in its Constitution:—

"To furnish preparatory instruction in Hebrew to students about to enter theological seminaries: To furnish elementary and advanced instruction in Hebrew to pastors and others: To furnish opportunities for the study of the cognate languages, and of such historical, literary, and theological subjects connected with the Old Testament as may be desired: To promote a more general interest in Old Testament study." These ends are to be attained "Through the Correspondence School of Hebrew: Through Summer Schools of Hebrew: Through such other organizations as may hereafter be found desirable."

Four summer schools will be carried on the coming summer: at Philadelphia, beginning about June 4; at Morgan Park, Ill., July 21; at New Haven, Conn., June 30; and at Chataqua, about August 4. For the direction of each of these schools a local committee is appointed. For the New England school this committee consists of Professors Harper; Day, of New Haven; C. R. Brown, Newton Centre; Francis Brown, New York; Lyon, Cambridge; Mitchell, Boston; Denio, Bangor; Binney, Middletown; Currie, Halifax.

With the support of such a body of scholars as constitutes the new Institute of Hebrew, and with an assured financial standing, the schools can hardly fail to grow in breadth and usefulness. One thing in the an-

nouncement particularly interests us. It is that, in defining the aims which are its reason for existence, the Institute puts first, "to furnish preparatory instruction in Hebrew to students about to enter theological seminaries." If there were no other this is reason enough. Instruction in the Hebrew language is no part of the proper work of a theological seminary. There is no reason why the rudiments of Hebrew should be taught there more than the rudiments of Greek or Latin.

It has been forced upon the seminaries by the colleges, which, as a general thing, completely ignore the existence of the Semitic languages. Hence the time which is given in the theological course to Old Testament studies is largely consumed in learning something of the language of the Old Testament. This is done under unfavorable conditions, because both teacher and taught feel that it is not the work they ought to be upon. Any plan which will make it possible for men entering the seminary to bring up the elements of Hebrew deserves the cordial support of all friends of Old Testament studies. That the schools of the Institute of Hebrew can do this there is no doubt. Will the men avail themselves of its advantages? The experiment only can decide. Something can be done by the seminaries, if not at once in requiring Hebrew for admission—that must come—at least in providing that those who present it may go on directly with exegetical work. Some of the seminaries already do this; others will.

George F. Moore.

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### BOOK NOTICES.

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DER PROCESS GALILEI'S UND DIE JESUITEN. VON DR. F. H. REUSCH, Professor an der Universität in Bonn. Large 8vo, pp. 484. Bonn: Eduard Weber's Verlag (Julius Flitner). 1879.

This book is some years old, but has not been antiquated by any newer discoveries. It is exhaustive, straightforward, and readable. It extenuates nothing, and sets down nothing in malice. The under-current of strong indignation pervading it is inevitable to any one who is not committed to the defense of the Curia, either as being its subject, or, like the late Tayler Lewis, its sympathizer in the war against new truth that comes to disturb the adjustments of old theologies. The complete publication of the archives has now enabled the case to be judged in full light. Reusch (who is an Old Catholic) writes with constant reference to Gebler's fair-minded narrative, and to the accounts of the three Jesuits, Grisar, Schneemann, and Desjardins, all having appeared since 1876.

The Curialists are true wolves at the brook. Not knowing how to forgive Galileo for having been persecuted, they slander him venomously. First, they tell us that his three children were all illegitimate. Perfectly true, but nothing to the purpose. Had he given no worse offense to Rome, he would have lived and died in peace. That "his apprehensions of morality" generally "were of the laxest kind," has not a particle of proof beyond this one irregular connection. And for thirty-two years before his death his life was acknowledged to be irreproachable, that of a good Christian, and a devout Catholic. His most intimate letters sustain both points. Not a shadow of theological aberration appears in them.

The Jesuits have even the effrontery to taunt him with his lack of the martyr-nature before the very persecutors whom they excuse, or defend, or even glorify. And, in truth, not one faintest spark of moral courage appears in the man through his whole life. Had he been different Rome would have had still greater infamy, and that would have been all. They even disparage his fame, while they lay stress on his undeniably egregious vanity. Just where he stands in the ranks of science men of science know, but that he is illustrious any one may know. He is even charged with falsely claiming the invention of the telescope, in the teeth of his own words that he got it from the Netherlands, but adapted it to astronomy. And if every one of these slanders were true, they are all irrelevant. He was arraigned, tried, condemned, followed up with life-long punishment, on the one charge of believing the Copernican theory true, and teaching it as true after having promised to forbear.

Reusch draws a powerful sketch of the absolute slavery to authority in which natural science was then held. The Bible, Aristotle, Reasoning, Observation, — such is actually the order of rank assigned to its sources by an approved writer of the time! Galileo's great sin was to have modestly pointed out that this order is exactly wrong-end-foremost, since the Bible, mentioning Nature only casually, and never for its own sake, must of course stand last in physics. The Jesuits, to do them credit, had felt the fresh breath of new truth, and perhaps rather enjoyed the dismay of the Dominicans. A father of the Roman College told Campanella that if Galileo had not embroiled himself with them he might have taught the Copernican theory in peace. Perhaps, then, Rome owes these powerful patrons the credit of having entangled herself hopelessly with astronomy in that century, as well as of having been brought to defy all history in this. But the arrogant Urban helped them as effectually then as the headstrong Manning now.

Galileo has been charged with having drawn the displeasure of Rome upon him not as a great physicist, but as a bad theologian. A good theologian rather, if at all. His letters to his faithful disciple the Benedictine Castelli and to the Grand-duchess Christina give the true relations of the Bible to physics in a form essentially perfect. The main point is, that a departure from phenomena would have bewildered the people, and spoil its main end, which is spiritual. But Galileo is everywhere faithful to the principle that the Bible must not be dragged in to disturb the coherence of physical proofs of physical facts. He only refers to it as compelled by the perversity of his opponents, and having, as Reusch remarks, no theological citations to use, is compelled to enlarge a little, and that most modestly, on the true principles of interpretation in this one regard. The Jesuit Cardinal Bellarmine appears to little credit beside him, though this great man is wholly innocent of personal motives. He acknowledged that Copernicus might be right, though denying that he could be proved right, and allowed that if he could be proved right the literal sense of certain texts must be abandoned. Yet he was not ashamed, as Inquisitor, to concur in a decision that the Copernican theory is "false and antisciptural." He here represents a class of divines as thick among us as among them, who count it their glory to persecute the adherents of a new physical theory as long as it is possible, by hook or crook, to hang on to the old. Truth at first-hand is their abhorrence; they can only endure it in the shape of tradition, after losing the first

freshness of its youth. Good men they are, doubtless, as Bellarmine was a good man, but they seem to be always afraid that if they tread out on the open waters of truth, Christ's hand will not have strength to sustain them.

Rome is unfortunate that two Popes are involved, through Galileo, in the condemnation of Copernicus. Urban VIII. had taken personal umbrage, but Paul V. had not. Both, distinctly and formally, supported the decree of condemnation. The Jesuit Grisar exposes the futility of the attempts to represent the decree of 1616 as merely disciplinary, not doctrinal. The reasoning and the result are so thoroughly interfused as to form one inseparable act. And the opinion of the Consultors, on which, without any exception to it, the Inquisition founded its action, under the presidency of the Pope, distinctly declares the doctrine of the sun's immovability "formally heretical." Grisar rightly remarks, moreover, that the permission given, through the Index Congregation, by the Inquisition, or rather by the Pope through this, to teach Copernicanism *ex hypothesi* does not mean that it might lawfully be held even conjecturally true. It must by all be held false, but might be used, like other mathematical or physical absurdities, as a convenient way of coördinating and explaining phenomena.

Galileo's correspondence during the seventeen years intervening between his admonition and his trial is full of the most bitter scorn, veiled in phrases of the humblest deference to the "higher illumination" which bound him to hold false a physical theory which every physical fact upheld as true. Papal infallibility, by means of Inquisitorial terrors, had set his intellectual integrity and his moral cowardice at constant war under the conduct of Italian craft. The publication of the Dialogue in the same strain at length drew down the thunders.

Of the more solemn trial of 1633, ending with Galileo's abjuration and life-long confinement, the Jesuits may have been the instigators. They appear to have been self-accused. They and theirs have abused him heartily enough since. But the measureless vanity and imperiousness of Urban VIII., so powerfully portrayed by the impartial Ranke, would have sufficed, without invoking the usual *deus ex machina*, coming here to entangle and not to untie. Maffeo Barberini, one of Galileo's warmest friends, had declared that had he been Pope at the time, the decree of 1616 should never have appeared. And yet this very man, — as Urban VIII. implacably offended that his idiotic appeal to the omnipotence of God against the truth of the Copernican theory had indeed, as he required, been brought by Galileo into the Dialogue, but, with fatal appositeness, had been put in the mouth of Simplicio, — never rested till he had ruined his friend, and had given the papacy a blow from which it has not recovered, and cannot recover. Sullen implacability ruled all has treatment of his illustrious friend till the latter died in 1642.

The Roman Inquisition is certainly not the most odious tribunal ever known among men. The Spanish Inquisition saves it from that bad pre-eminence. But its slow unrelentingness to smother the breath of intellectual life is perhaps only the more strongly set off, in Galileo's case, by the ostentatious mildness of his preliminary treatment. He was mainly quartered, "interned," in the house of his faithful and courageous friend Niccolini, the Tuscan ambassador, and during the three weeks of his detention in the Inquisition was allotted cheerful chambers, allowed quite a range, had his own servant, and corresponded freely. And indeed only



once in his life did the Inquisition lay wait for his letters, given or received. Moreover, it is conceded that Galileo was not actually tortured. Indeed, it was against usage, at Rome, to torture men of his age and infirmities. And Reusch gives strong, perhaps conclusive, reasons for holding that he was not even, as the rule prescribed in such cases, led into the torture-chamber, unclothed, and bound as in act to be tortured. The sentence and the record are both opposed to this assumption. Threatened with the torture he was, and his trembling signature to this day's record shows how deeply shaken the infirm old man of sixty-nine was by the terrible menace. But still "giving a Catholic answer" as to his intention, he was only condemned, as suspected of heresy, to make solemn and public abjuration, and to stand liable to such a measure and length of custody as the Holy Office might please. And the Holy Office, under the unforgiving Pope, whose wounded vanity was so hard to heal, was pleased to shut him out from the view of his fair Florence, except in a few of its most secluded streets, as long as he lived. Even this utmost limit of its grace was wrung from the Pope in grudging concessions years apart. Urban's first direction in citing Galileo to Rome, that if he really could not come, his recovery should be awaited, and he should then be brought in chains, is so ferocious, that it can hardly have been meant seriously. But it heightens our detestation of the man and the system. And this concerning a book that had been months before the Roman Censor, the tenor of which had been communicated to various cardinals, and to the Pope himself, and which had been licensed with all authority!

Was this condemnation of the Copernican theory *ex cathedra*? It was doctrinal, as shown by Grisar. It was not made by bull, nor subscribed by the Pope's own hand. But sound authorities allow that a doctrinal decree, issued by a Congregation under papal direction, like this, communicated to the various nuncios, like this, may well be *ex cathedra*. The Jesuit Grisar makes short work of the ordinary arguments in deprecation of its *ex cathedra* character, and then goes into some of his own, which Reusch easily shows to be more frivolous still. Had it appeared true, it would doubtless be cited now in attestation of papal infallibility. But a system artificial to the core, like some of our theories of Inspiration, needs as many loop-holes of escape as they. And the test of an *ex cathedra* definition seems to be like the famous one for trying a fungus: "Eat it, and if it kills you, it is a toadstool; if it nourishes you, it is a mushroom." This bit of Curialistic diet, administered to the faithful, has been so disastrous that it must pass for very fallible toadstool instead of infallible pontifical mushroom. The ingredients of the poisoned chalice do indeed appear to have been commended very fully to the lips of those that prepared it.

The last chapters of Reusch's book show how the Curialistic claims to control of thought, far beyond the limits of the Vatican decrees, are ever advancing upon manliness and freedom, like the narrowing chamber of Italian story. But now, happily, the only slaves of Rome are those that choose to be. The main body of Catholic divines are not slaves of Rome, because they find their own theological image reflected in her, for good or ill.

Charles C. Starbuck.

THE CENTENARY OF LEICESTER ACADEMY, held September 4, 1884, including the historical address by Hon. WILLIAM W. RICE and the poem by Rev. THOMAS HILL, D. D., with historical supplement. Worcester, Mass. [Published by the Trustees.] 1884.

The centennial celebration at Leicester Academy last September was a notable one, and has a worthy memorial in this attractive volume, to the preparation of which the Rev. A. H. Coolidge, president of the trustees, has given much rewarding care and labor. It contains incidentally much biography, town and family history, as well as the wit and good feeling of a festival, and it preserves in becoming form the valuable historical oration by Hon. W. W. Rice, and the poem by ex-President Hill, together with the letters and addresses of other alumni and friends of the school. The appendix and supplement give additional information, and the whole book, including the illustrations, tells in a connected way the good work of this important school and its varying fortunes for a hundred years.

This book has interest for many besides Leicester people and Leicester pupils. It is a contribution to the discussion of an important problem. Much attention has been directed of late to our incorporated and endowed secondary schools. Many of them were crippled and some were closed when the free public high schools came in thirty years ago. The patronage of the best and strongest was different, if not less than before, and pupils came for different reasons and for other ends. But the high schools are no longer an experiment; they have showed what they can do, and also what they cannot do; the academies are reviving, new ones are established, and in one or two cases an endowment is already secured not altogether inadequate to the wants of a strong and stable institution of learning. The changes in the colleges also give new dignity and responsibility to the secondary schools, requiring changes in instruction, administration, government. The schools must do much of the work once done by the colleges, both in creating scholarship and forming character. To do this work well requires men of ability and of ample equipment and experience. A good academy needs buildings, appliances, faculties, funds, of the same kind and almost to the same extent as required by a college of thirty years ago. To support university methods in the colleges, and make them effective, the secondary schools must be well administered and well manned. The formative and decisive period is passed by our boys in the schools. The schools accordingly must be strengthened, and the friends of sound learning and of true religion, not neglecting the colleges, the universities, and the professional schools, must give for a time their best thought and their best gifts to our endowed academies and other secondary schools. The usefulness of Leicester Academy, in spite of all obstacles and hindrances, is a powerful argument and appeal. If it has not had the uniform and brilliant prosperity of such schools as the Phillips Andover Academy and the Phillips Exeter Academy, the reasons are easy to see, and yet it has done enough to stand in the goodly fellowship of these and a few other schools which have been pioneers, and have shaped the policy and set the standard of the so-called "preparatory" schools of the country. They were planted "to benefit mankind" and "in the name of the Great Redeemer;" they were fostered by the liberality of truly great men, who saw prophetically

the needs of the coming generations; they have with very small resources done a great work. At this moment they have a new and larger work laid upon them. They are straining every nerve to do it. They need money, and what is better than money, and even more difficult to command — the strong mind, the great heart, the generous purposes of such men as the Phillippes, and Crafts, and Pearson, and Abbott, and Taylor.

*C. F. P. Bancroft.*

LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. By GEORGE P. MARSH. First Series. Revised and enlarged Edition. Pp. xv., 583. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND OF THE EARLY LITERATURE IT EMBODIES. By GEORGE P. MARSH. Revised Edition. Pp. xv., 574. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

Twenty-five years have elapsed since the first of these two notable volumes was given to the public, antedating its companion volume by about two years. They were received on both sides of the Atlantic with immediate and distinguished favor by the best authorities in English scholarship. The first volume at once became a text-book in many of our leading colleges. Public libraries and private were enriched by the addition of these scholarly works. Their accurate and extended erudition, their admirable arrangement, the skillful conduct of inquiry, and the clear, vigorous, flexible, and interesting style, made them eagerly welcome to the college-student, the accomplished philologist, and the man of literary tastes leading the intellectual life. Mr. Marsh's opinions on the English language, and upon its literature prior to the Elizabethan era, became of inestimable value as authority, and his guidance to the purest springs of information on the topic was trustworthy and entertaining. Other important works upon the same interesting subject have been published during the last quarter of a century, but the authority of Marsh still holds an undisputed eminence in the front rank of scholarship in English. The most significant evidence that he has not been outgrown is the publishers' re-issue of the series. The "Origin and History," etc., is an exact reprint of the earlier editions, with a slight change in the weight of the paper and in the binding. The First Series has been greatly improved by the incorporation of the notes, composing the Appendix in the previous edition, into their appropriate places in the foot-notes in the body of the volume. There are also occasional modifications in the text which embody certain results in linguistic criticism during the past twenty years. The new arrangement has necessitated a reprinting of the entire volume. The change appears in the use of closer type and narrower "leading," and results in another advantage — the reduction of the size of the book by more than a hundred pages. But there is one serious and irritating disadvantage that must not be overlooked — the omission of the copious index that was so invaluable to the former editions. If this omission is an exceptional negligence of the binder in the single volume before us, it is a blameworthy misfortune; if it is an intentional omission as a policy of the publishers, it should meet with unsparing animadversion from every reviewer of the book. An index to a work of this kind is not merely a convenience, it is an essential. Notwithstanding this grave deficiency the two volumes remain a noble and enduring monument of American scholarship in English Language and Literature.

*J. W. Churchill.*

THE EARTH AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION. A last Revision of "Man and Nature." By GEORGE P. MARSH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

One of the fascinating books of boyhood was Marsh's "Man and Nature." The story it told of the changes wrought on forests, rivers, lakes, and deserts by man was almost incredible. The new edition of this book under a more specific, and therefore better, title, furnishes many additional details and refers the reader to a great number of authorities on the subject, while the treatment and general conclusions remain unchanged. The chapter of chief importance at present is that on Forests, in relation to inundations, the rainfall, retention of moisture, and climate. The facts are carefully collected, and opinions cautiously expressed.

*George Harris.*

EGYPT AND BABYLON, FROM SACRED AND PROFANE SOURCES. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. A., Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford; Canon of Canterbury Cathedral. 12mo, pp. 329. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

Canon Rawlinson is best known by his "Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient World," which appeared more than twenty years ago. The object of that work was to shed new light from the monuments on the story of the past. The present volume is an essay in the same direction, only here the records to be illustrated are sacred. The author cites in succession the notices of Babylon in Genesis, in Kings, in Chronicles, and in the Major Prophets. With them he gives the secular confirmations. Having devoted his first twelve chapters to the Empire on the Euphrates, he devotes the last twelve to the Empire on the Nile.

The book has obvious and decided merits. Its plan is simple. The style is clear and flowing. Dry details are avoided. There is evidence of ample learning, especially on the classical side. The author presents in an English dress some striking modern discoveries that had not come before the popular eye. For the most part he shows sobriety of judgment and candor of temper. He is not afraid of the predictive element in prophecy. Where others are sapping the faith he would strengthen it.

One of the interesting facts brought out by the book is the monumental corroboration of Nebuchadnezzar's campaign in Egypt. This had been foretold by Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Infidels, however, laughed at the idea of such an event. Whereupon an Egyptian statue in the Louvre and a Babylonian cylinder in the British Museum come forward to attest it. From their joint witness Professor Rawlinson appears to fix the very year of the campaign to be 568 B. C., and the name of the king to be Amasis.

Our author's reasoning is manly. A good specimen of it is his argument for the presence of Joseph in Egypt under the Shepherd Kings. Why? Because the chief characteristics of the Shepherds marked the sovereign whose vizier Joseph became. According to Syncellus, the Byzantine chronographer, this was Apepi (Apophis). Now his capital at Tanis in the Delta and his monotheistic movement toward Set (Sutekh) were precisely in the vein of the Pharaoh who gives audience to the arriving Jacob,<sup>1</sup> and who sees the Spirit of God in Jacob's gifted son. The

<sup>1</sup> Genesis xlvii. 7.

Hyksôs, too, introduced the horse into Egypt. But in Joseph's time the horse is named, where in Abram's day there is no trace of his existence. How natural to think of Joseph as associated with the dynasty that rode into power on their Eastern steeds. It is a pleasure to find our author combating Brugsch's route of the Exodus and recognizing the Egyptological merit of Dr. Trumbull's "Kadesh-Barnea." Here and there we note inexactness and precipitancy. M. Chabas's famous identification of Aperiû and Hebrew, which Professor Rawlinson makes his own, is an instance of the first blemish.<sup>1</sup> An instance of the second is his statement on page 226 that Tel-el-Maskouteh has been *proved* to mark the site of Pi-thom. This was denied by Lepsius and is disputed by Dr. Birch.

We commend the book as an epitome and a pioneer. If it call out a volume more technical, more elaborate, more original, it will fulfill a high function. Assyriology has given us the masterly "Keilinschriften und das alte Testament," by Dr. Eberhard Schrader. It remains for Egyptology to produce its peer.

John Phelps Taylor.

**ECCLESIOLOGY.** A Treatise on the Church and Kingdom of God on Earth.

By EDWARD D. MORRIS, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Lane Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1885.

This is a book of rare breadth and candor. The treatment throughout is strong and clear, not evading controverted questions, but never passing over into mere polemics.

The book is divided into five chapters under the following titles:—

Chapter I. The Church in the Divine Plan. Chapter II. The Impersonal Constituents of the Church. Chapter III. The Personal Constituents of the Church. Chapter IV. The Church as a Divine Kingdom. Chapter V. The Church in Human Society.

The discussion of church creeds, under Chapter II., though brief, is most satisfactory. The creed is considered as vital in its relation to the church, as well as formal and, within proper limits, authoritative; but it is never to stand forth as a divisive standard, and is never to be used as an instrument to arrest freedom of inquiry or "to bind the household of faith in unwilling allegiance to opinion or dogma." We wish that we could share fully the opinion of Dr. Morris in respect to the comparative growth and influence of the great teaching branches of the church, as expressed in the following question: "Is it not an obvious lesson of history that those branches of the Church which have rested less on the priesthood or the sacraments, or on liturgies or polity or other externalities,—which have made much rather of doctrine, and have held themselves most strenuously to the task of teaching the world what the Christian doctrine is,—have attained the largest growth, the most enduring position, the widest influence?" If this question means that the teaching church has been and is the greatest factor in intellectual and spiritual progress we should as unhesitatingly, as gladly, answer, Yes. But we suspect that as a present fact, and in respect to numbers, even in the Protestant communion, the branches of the church which rely most upon teaching are not outgrowing those which place chief reliance upon the sacraments and the liturgy, or those which place large reliance upon an effective working polity, united with evangelistic ardor.

<sup>1</sup> See Brugsch, *Egypt under the Pharaohs*, vol. ii., pp. 91 and 134.



In passing from the Impersonal to the Personal Constituents of the Church — from the thought of doctrines and sacraments and ordinances to that of the personality of the church in its members and officers — the discussion is at once lifted to a spiritual plane. It is refreshing and inspiring to read such words as these: "The Church is not a mechanism or a crystallization, but rather a vital organism instinct with life. Within its sacred inclosure, and under its gracious influence, the human soul is to hear and accept divine truth, to be anointed and sealed through the sacraments, and to be cultured and stimulated through the means of grace into vigorous spiritual life. In a word, it is the Personal Element which renders all impersonal elements worthy, and which above all else should make the church itself glorious in our eyes." The treatment of the doctrine of church membership is largely historical, but the historical illustrations are adduced to show the danger of departing from spiritual tests. The position of President Edwards is stated and maintained, that it is a true spiritual experience which constitutes a person a worthy candidate for admission to the organized household of faith. And as regards the relative responsibility of the church and the candidate in the matter of admission our author accepts the further opinion of President Edwards "that the particular church must share with the professing disciple in the solemn act in which he is engaging; that it is sacredly bound to settle for itself no less than for him the question whether his profession is credible, whether it may be accepted as the outward evidence of a truly regenerate nature."

In the chapter upon Polity the fairness of Dr. Morris counts to the advantage of Presbyterianism. High Church Presbyterianism is the most difficult of all forms of High Churchism to maintain. In discarding the Biblical warrant for any exact and extreme form of government, Presbyterianism is given the advantage of those points when it is strong. "Presbyterianism *pure divino* — a system directly prescribed and enjoined as to details in the New Testament — can no more be proven than a *pure divino* Prelacy or Independency. The attempt to find in the Bible a full, exact, invariable mode of government, adjusted to the needs of the Church in all varieties of condition, and so enjoined upon it that all departures and deviations become unscriptural and schismatical, has often been made in the interest of each of the three Protestant varieties of church polity, but has always been made in vain. And well will it be for Protestantism if it surrenders this futile effort in future to the Papacy, and plants itself on the broad principle that any polity is legitimate which stands substantially on Biblical foundations, and which justifies itself practically in the judgment and experience of the household of faith." Having made this statement Dr. Morris proceeds to argue that the Presbyterian or representative polity meets these tests in a high degree, and in the aggregate more fully than any other.

The least satisfying part of the book — owing to the want of a sufficient expansion — is that in which the church is considered in its relation to human society. Here we think our author might have treated his subject much more fully. Indeed, we question whether he has made his definition of the church sufficiently emphatic at this point. "The Church is an organization of those who love God, existing permanently under some prescribed constitution for the purpose of worship and testimony concerning Him. More broadly, the Church of God on earth is the company or

community of the pious, separated spiritually from the rest of mankind, and existing organically through all time, in order to bear witness to His person, authority, truth, and grace, and to worship and glorify Him before the world." This definition does not recognize sufficiently the "church in its relation to human society"; unless this relation is included under the idea of bearing witness. The missionary, or distinctively Christian nature of the church of Christ is not made conspicuous. And yet in the introduction our author lays great stress upon this comprehensive aim of Christianity. Christianity is represented as social and generic in its idea and manifestation. "It contemplates man in the aggregate; it seeks the restoration of human society; its gracious purpose can be consummated only in the salvation of humanity. . . . Christianity must aim at nothing less than the regeneration of that humanity in every aspect and every relation." We can but wish that the chapter which treats of this aim of Christianity as expressed in the church had filled out more completely the thought as it evidently lies in the mind of the author.

But on the whole we are more than content with the treatise before us. The book is wholesome in all its parts, positive and vigorous in its affirmation of vital principles, careful in its details, and wide in its outlook. It is the work of a thinker competent to his subject.

Wm. J. Tucker.

OBITER DICTA. 16mo, pp. 232. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

A little book abounding in pleasant banter, humor, and literary allusion, with a constant vein of seriousness and a practical aim. In style it reminds one of the freshness and raciness of Charles Lamb. The title is thus explained: "An *obiter dictum*, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong, bindeth none — not even the lips that utter it." The subjects discussed are: Carlyle, The Alleged Obscurity of Mr. Browning's Poetry, Truth-hunting, Actors, A Rogue's Memoirs, The *Via Media*, Falstaff. Carlyle is considered as a man of letters, and the chief characteristics of his books are defined as "mysticism in thought, realism in description, and humour in both." His grievous faults of character, as disclosed in the "Reminiscences," are sheltered under the plea that we are not to quarrel with genius, — a maxim which is quite forgotten when, farther on, the author deals with the infirmities and sins of Coleridge. By far the best essay in the series, and deserving to be widely read, is the one on Robert Browning's Obscurity. It indicates the writer's capacity for stronger and more sustained critical work than appears in this volume. The caption "Truth-hunting" is a suggestive description of the method of those who spend their time in speculative dissipation to the neglect of the knowledges and charities which are within reach and obligatory. As a fair specimen of our author's work, and for their own sake, we quote a few paragraphs: —

"Nothing so much tends to blur moral distinctions, and to obliterate plain duties, as the free indulgence of speculative habits. We must all know many a sorry scrub who has fairly talked himself into the belief that nothing but his intellectual difficulties prevents him from being another St. Francis. We think we could suggest a few score of other obstacles.

"Would it not be better for most people, if, instead of stuffing their heads

with controversy, they were to devote their scanty leisure to reading books, such as, to name one only, Kaye's 'History of the Sepoy War,' which are crammed full of activities and heroisms, and which force upon the reader's mind the healthy conviction that, after all, whatever mysteries may appertain to mind and matter, and notwithstanding grave doubts as to the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, it is bravery, truth and honour, loyalty and hard work, each man at his post, which make this planet inhabitable?

"In these days of champagne and shoddy, of display of teacups and rotten foundations . . . it becomes plain that the real wants of the age are not analyses of religious belief, nor discussions as to whether 'Person' or 'Stream of Tendency' are the apter words to describe God by; but a steady supply of honest, plain-sailing men who can be safely trusted with small sums, and to do what in them lies to maintain the honour of the various professions, and to restore the credit of English workmanship. We want Lambs, not Coleridges. The verdict to be striven for is not 'Well guessed,' but 'Well done.'"

Our author has a knack at half-truths; which, however, he so puts as constantly to stir us up to thinking of their requisite complements. And his half-truths are worth the saying. The essays on "Actors" and "The *Via Media*" are instances specially in point.

*Egbert C. Smyth.*

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

*Funk & Wagnalls, New York.* Letters from Hell. Given in English by L. W. J. S. With a Preface by George MacDonald, LL.D. 16mo, pp. ix., 350. 1885. \$1.00.

*Thomas Whittaker, New York.* A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. By Joseph Agar Beet. Pp. xxii., 232. 1885. \$1.50.

*Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.* ΔΙΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΔΩΔΕΚΑ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ. Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. Recently discovered and published by Philotheos Bryennios, Metropolitan of Nicomedia. Edited with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes. By Roswell D. Hitchcock and Francis Brown, Professors in Union Theological Seminary, New York. A new edition, revised and greatly enlarged. 8vo, pp. cxv., 85. 1885. \$2.00; — Obiter Dicta. 16mo, pp. 232. 1885. \$1.00; — Personal Traits of British Authors; Hood, Macaulay, Sydney Smith, Jerrold, Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, Thackeray. Edited by Edward T. Mason. With Portraits. 12mo, pp. viii., 334. 1885. \$1.50; — American Presbyterianism. Its Origin and Early History. Together with an Appendix of Letters and Documents, many of which have recently been discovered. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D. D., Davenport Professor of Hebrew and the Cognate Languages in the Union Theological Seminary, New York City. With Maps. 8vo, pp. xviii., 373. Appendix, pp. cxlii. 1885. \$3.00; — Philosophic Series. No. VIII. Herbert Spencer's Philosophy, as culminated in his Ethics. Examined by James McCosh, D.D., LL.D., D. L., President of Princeton College, author of "Intuitions of the Mind," "Examination of Mill's Philosophy," etc. 8vo, pp. iv., 71. 1885. 50 cents.

*Jansen, McClurg and Co., Chicago.* The Dial. A Monthly Journal of Current Literature. [The publishers of this vigorous and excellent Chicago Monthly desire that it should not be confounded with a New York publication bearing the same name and recently suspended.]

# THE CHRISTIAN REGISTER.

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Instructor in Philosophy in Harvard College. Crown 8vo, \$2.00.

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